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Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether theCA properly held that resp's 
~nticompetitive conduct was exempt from the Sherman Act under 
vf Parker v. Brown and its progeny. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petrs are four towns adjacent 
to resp City of Eau Claire (City). The City has a monopoly on 
sewage treatment services in the relevant geographical area, but 
not on the collection or transportation of the sewage to the 
treatment plant. Resp refuses to supply sewage treatment 
services to petrs. The City, however, has provided treatment 
services to individual landowners in the towns, but only 





agree to become annexed by the City and , thereby obtain sewage 
collection and transportation services from the City. 
Petrs brought suit seeking injunctive relief. They alleged 
that the City's denial of treatment services violated the Sherman 
Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and a common law 
duty under state law. The DC (WD Wise., Shabaz) dismissed the 
Sherman Act claims ruling that the City's conduct was exempt 
under Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943); the Water Pollution 
Control Act claim was dismissed on the grounds that the Act does 
not provide a right to sue and that the towns did not exhaust 
administrative remedies. The DC then dismissed the pendent state 
claim. 
On appeal, petrs contested only the dismissal of the 
antitrust claims. The CA found that under a series of cases, 
beginning with Parker v. Brown, supra, and ending with Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982), in 
order for its activities to be exempt from antitrust liability, a 
municipality must be acting pursuant to a clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy. The CA first rejected 
petrs' contention that it must find a state policy authorizing 
the City to use its monopoly power over sewage treatment to gain 
monopolies in collection and transportation. It is sufficient, 
the CA found, if the state gave the City authority to operate in 
the area of sewage services and to refuse to provide treatment 
services. If that much was found, then it could be assumed that 
the State contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result. 
i 
-3-
The CA then rejected petrs' contention that the state policy 
must direct or compel the municipality to engage in the 
challenged conduct before Parker immunity can be found. The CA 
held that "any municipality acting pursuant to clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy which 
evidences an intent of the legislature to displace competition 
with regulation--whether compelled, directed, authorized, or in 
the form of a prohibition--is entitled to antitrust immunity 
because conduct pursuant to such a policy would constitute state 
action." App. 10. In the present case, the CA found that 
antitrust immunity would attach if there was a clearly 
articulated state policy authorizing the City to refuse to 
provide sewage treatment to the Towns. 
"- The CA then found a clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed state policy in several state statutes and state cases 
interpreting the statutes. Wise. Stat. §66.069(2) (c) provides 
that a city may fix the area in which to extend sewage services 
and that the city has no obligation to serve beyond that area. 
Section 144.07(lm) provides that the state dept. of natural 
resources may require a city to extend its sewerage system to a 
town, but that the order becomes void if the town refuses to 
become annexed to the city. The CA found that the City "acted 
pursuant to and in a manner consistent with [state] policy." App. 
14. 
Next, the CA rejected petrs' contention that the State must 
actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct before antitrust 
immunity could attach. The "active supervision" requirement 
-4-
comes from California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which involved a statutory scheme 
that allowed private parties to establish resale prices. In City 
of Boulder, however, the Court left open the question whether the 
active supervision requirement applies to municipalities. 455 
u.s., at 51 n.l4. The supervision requirement was necessary in 
Midcal to assure that private parties did not abuse the 
anticompetitive power given to them. No supervision is needed 
here, however, because the local govt operates pursuant to 
expressed restraints imposed by the state in its polcies and 
delegation of authority. The CA held that "if the conduct of 
local government in providing municipal services is authorized by 
the state and is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy, the activity is state action and entitled to 
immunity even though state supervision does not exist." App. 16. 
The CA also found that requiring state supervision would be 
unwise. It would erode the concept of local autonomy and home 
rule authority expressed in the state statutes and constitution. 
The judgment of the DC was affirmed. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the CA decision conflicts 
with decisions of this Court because it does not require a 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy and 
does not require active state supervision. Petrs contend that 
the CA found that mere neutrality by the state was sufficient to 
meet the policy test and confer antitrust immunity. Petrs argue 
that the CA focused on the wrong service; petrs do not argue that 
the City is prohibited from monopolizing sewage treatment, but 
.. -5-
rather, that there is no state policy tp displace competition in 
the provision of collection and transportation services. 
Petrs argue that the active state supervision requirement is 
applicable to municipalities under prior decisions of this Court. 
There is no distinction between types of "persons" to whom the 
antitrust laws apply or the "persons" who should benefit from 
state action immunity. The statutes relied upon by the CA as 
expressing state policy contain no restrictions or limitations on 
the actions that the City can take. The City is free to pursue 
its own parochial interests. State supervision is necessary to 
guarantee that the anticompetitive conduct is the state's and not 
the city's. 
Petrs also contend that the decision below conflicts with 
Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (CA9 1982). In 
Ronwin, CA9 found that the state policy must address the alleged 
restraint, there a grading procedure by which the Bar Committee 
passed only a predetermined number of candidates. It was not 
sufficient that the Committee was authorized by the state to 
determine who was qualified and who passed the exam. Thus, in 
CA9 a general authorization is not enough to show that the state 
contemplated and condoned specific anticompetitive activities. 
Resp argues that this case involves the simple question 
whether a City can refuse to extend municipal sewer service to 
surrounding towns without violating the Sherman Act. The CA 
correctly determined that resp has acted in accordance with and 
pursuant to state policy. Under state statutes, the City has a 
~ right to fix the limits of its sewer services: the statute 
. . . -6-
(§66.09(2) (c)) specifically contemplate~ and authorizes the 
precise action involved here: that a city may determine not to 
extend sewer services extraterritorially. 
Resp also argues that the CA was correct in finding a state 
policy to require annexation before city services are made 
available to outlying areas. Section 144.07(lm) was upheld in 
City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W. 2d 342 (1977) 
where the Wise. s.ct. found that the statute balances two 
competing state concerns: providing essential services to areas 
outside city limits and encouraging growth and expansion of 
cities; annexation requirements provide the correct balance. 
Also, in a similar antitrust case under state law, the Wise. 
s.ct. found that "the legislature viewed annexation by the city 
as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before 
extending sewer services to the area." 314 N.W.2d 321, 326 
(1982). Thus, contrary to petrs' claim, state statutes and case 
law are not "neutral" as to the activities in which resp engaged. 
Resp claims that Ronwin is distinguishable, so there is no 
conflict. There, the CA found that the challenged restraint was 
not adopted or directly authorized by the AZ s.ct. Resp notes 
that the Ronwin case was granted (Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474, 
5/16/83). Resp argues that regardless of what standard of 
specificity may emerge from the Ronwin case, the grant of state 
authority in this case is sufficient to confer immunity. 
Finally, resp repeats the CA's reasoning and argues that the 
CA was correct to conclude that the state supervision requirement 
does not apply to local government activities. This holding is 
-7-
in accord with Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 
I 
679 F.2d 805 (CAlO 1982), cert denied. 1/10/83 (JUSTICES WHITE & 
BLACKMUN would grant) • 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA's decision on the question whether 
there was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy seems correct. Nonetheless, there is some question about 
how specific the articulation of state policy must be. Although 
Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474, is distinguishable because it 
involves a state agency rather than a municipality, it should 
shed some light on the issue. The primary issue in the present 
case is whether the active state supervision requirement should 
apply to local governments acting pursuant to state policy. The 
question was left open in City of Boulder as noted by the CA and 
is an important one. At present, I recommend a hold for Hoover 
v. Ronwin, No. 82-1474. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Hold for 82-1474 
There is a response. 
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Five cases were held for Hoover v. Ronwi • ~/} 7 ~.'sJ.-;:Q:;a<k~ ... ,:~ 
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, No 82-1832: Resp has 
a monopoly on sewage treatment services in its ge raphical area. 
Petrs are 4 towns adjacent to resp that would like to use resp' 
sewage treatment facilities. Resp allows individual lando rs 
to use its treatment facilites only if they agree come 
annexed to resp. Petrs sought injunctive reli , arguing inter 
alia that resp's policy violated The S an Act. The DC 
dismissed the Sherman Act claim on ground that resp's conduct 
was exempt from liability under th Parker v. ~~~t! ~~ction 
doctrine. ~ ~ ~ 
On appeal, the found that re~p was acting pursuant to a ~J~~ 
clearly articulated and a firma vely expressed state policy of ·~ 
giving cit1es au or n e ar o sewage service~
and to refuse to provide treatment services. The CA7 assumed ~ ' 
from this policy that the State intended to displace competition 
with regulation. The court rejected petr's contention that the · ~ ~ 
State must •compel• the particular anticompetitive conduct befor~~- 7 
the state action doctrine applies. Relying on Community ~~ 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982) and ~Ai,~~ 
city of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 u.s. 389~ ,~ 
(1978), the court stated that it did not matter whether the 
challenged activity was compelled, authorized, or directed, s~~'' 
long as the State intended to displace competition. ~ 
The CA7 also rejected petrs' contention that the State must 
actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct before antitrust 
immunity could attach. Although the Court in California Liquor 
Qealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 u.s. 97 (1980), had 
required •active state supervision,• that case had involved 
private anticompetitive conduct. In Boulder the Court left open~ 
the question whether the active supervision requirement applies ~f­
to municipalities. The CA7 held that no active supervision of ~ ~ 
local governments is needed. '· a.c;.~ 
This case was held on the premise that Hoover v. Ronwin would  
shed some light on the amount of clear articulation and active ~ 
supervision necessary for application of Parker v. Brown 
immunity. As written, Hoover does not reach these issues. Thus, 
a GVR is not appropriate. The CA7's rejection of a •compulsion• 
requirement conflicts with the holding of the CAS in Southern 
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., et al. v. United States 
(see attached hold memo on No. 82-1922). The cases can be 
distinguished on the ground that Southern Motor Carriers involves 
the activity of a private association while this case involves 
the anticompetitive conduct of a muncipal,ity. This distinction 
seems more semantic than substantive, however, because the origin 
of the "compulsion" requirement is language in Goldfarb v. 
Vir9inia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975)--a case involving the 
act1vities of a state agency. If the Court decides to grant on 
the compulsion issue, it shou a so cons1 CA7's decision 
not to require a showing of " ctive state supervis1 " Although 
there is no conflict on this issue, 1t 1s ant question 
left open in Boulder. I will recommend a grant in Southern 
Motor Carriers, No. 82-1~2. If it is granted, I would either 
grant or hold this case.~{ It may be best to grant both cases, as 
there is a substantial overlap of issues. 
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83-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair (CA7) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is another case presenting a question as to 
the applicability of the "state action" doctrine of Parker 
v. Brown. As in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder, a 
municipality is charged with operating a monopoly contrary 
to the Sherman Act. 
The parties are four Wisconsin 
adjacent to respondent, the city of Eau Clair. 
townships 
The towns 
filed this suit for injunctive relief, alleging that the 
city's sewage treatment facility - built in part with 
federal funds - is the only such facility available to the 
surrounding area. The city refuses to permit the towns to 
use its sewage treatment facility unless and until they 
agree to be annexed. The towns claim that they are 
potential competitors of the city in the collection and 
transportation of sewage, and that this competition is 
foreclosed by the city's monopolistic refusal to permit 
them to use its sewage treatment plant. The case was 
submitted on cross summary judgment motions. The DC 
granted judgment to the city. The Court of Appeals (CA7) 
2. 
affirmed, and we granted cert because of the importance of 
the case to municipalities in most if not all states. 
As I view this case, its decision turns on 
Wisconsin law. Curiously, none of the briefs - not even 
the city's brief commences the argument by a full 
explanation and quotation of the relevant Wisconsin 
statutes. These are set forth in the appendix to 
respondent's brief, but are rarely - if ever - quoted in 
the brief itself. 
In considering this case, we will, of course, 
bear in mind the "rate bureau" case from CAS (as I dictate 
this I do not have the name and number of the case before 
me} • In that case, private rate bureaus set up by the 
trucking industry proposed intrastate rates to the state 
utility commission that alone had authority to approve the 
rates. The rate bureaus were not"specifically authorized 
by state law, but had long been accepted. Here, in 
contrast, no private party or entity is involved. 
----------~~------------- / 
The rate bureau case was instituted by the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The 
government argued, and CAS agreed, that~rivate 
"'v 
defendant (e.g., a rate bureau} relies on the state action 
doctrine, it must prove that its action was "compelled" by 
3. 
state law. In the rate bureau case the defendants were 
private, and although there was state approval of the 
rates there was no "compulsion". The Solicitor General 
has filed an amicus brief in this case arguing that the 
state action doctrine does apply where the defendant is a 
municipality, and its action is merely authorized (not 
compelled) by the state. Indeed, the centerpiece of the 
SG' s amicus brief is the emphasis placed on the 
distinctions between private and public defendants and 
whether the action is authorized rather than compelled. 
The two cases we will be hearing this fall are 
particularly interesting because they involve 
consideration of the entire group of cases that have 
presented Pc_.;;.a;...;;;r~k....;e;:...;r"--_v;_ • .;___;;B:;..;r=-o=-w~n state act ion questions • The 
cases ~not entirely easy to harmonize. Bates and Ronwin 
are viewed by the SG as examples of private party 
defendants whose action was held to be within the Brown 
exception because the final action was by a state supreme 
court acting for the state. 1 
11. The SG does not note that althought tfie 
parties in Ronwin were members of the bar examining 




It is clear that cities are authorized to 
construct and operate "systems of sewerage". Section 
62.81(1). It also is clear that "each city may 
~t 
ordinance fix the limits of such [sewerage] service 1n 
unincorporate areas", and "the municipal utility shall 
have no obligation to serve beyond the area so 
delineated". §66.069(2) (c). The opinion of the DC in 
this case concludes that "indiviudally" and also when 
"viewed together" the Wisconsin statutes justify the 
conclusion reached by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a 
case brought under state antitrust law. The case is Town 
of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 314 N.w. 2d 321, 325 
(1982): 
"It seems that the legislature [of Wisconsin] 
viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding 
unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro guo 
that a city could require before extending sewer 
service to the area." 
In sum, it is agreed (conceded) that the 
"monopoly" exetcised by the town of Hallie with respect to 
its sewage treatment facility was authorized by state law. 
Active State Supervision 
5. 
Most recently in California Retail Liquor 
Dealers v. Midcal, 445 u.s. 97, 105 (1980), a two-part 




unanimous Court: the state 
~ "clearly articulated 
as 
and 
affirmatively expres~e " policy to displace competition 
"2- . 
with regulation, an -- the state policy must be "actively 
supervised" by the state itself. 
The towns argue that neither prong of this test 
is met. Their argument is weak with respect to the 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" policy. 
s h' . As noted above, Wisconsin law meet t 1s test. It 1s 
1\ 
conceded, however, that Wisconsin does not "actively 
supervise" what the cities do with respect to extending or 
refusing to extend municipal services beyond city limits. 
The an~er given by CA 7, and relied on by respondent and 
1\ 
the SG, is that Midcal involved private price fixing that 
was authorized by the state, but was not supervised by it. 
The Court of Appeals held that active state supervision 
was not necessary where a municipality rather than 
private parties is the defendant. Moreover, 
traditionally states delegate broad authority to 
municipalities to provide local services. As respondents 
and numerous amici argue, the structure of state and 
municipal government would have to be altered rna ter ially 
if, to protect municipalities from anti trust liability, 
the state itself must actively supervise whether and when 
municipal services are extended beyond the boundaries of 
the cities. 
Is Authorization Alone Sufficient under Parker v. Brown? 
Perhaps the basic question in this case is 
whether, where the defendant is a municipality, state 
authorization of its monopolistic conduct, comes within 
the Parker v. Brown exception. There is language - though 
perhaps viewed as dicta - in both City of Lafayette and 
Boulder to the effect that "authorization" is sufficient. 
Neither of these cases involved traditional municipal 
services, though in City of Lafayette the provision of 
public utility service ha~ been traditional for many years 
in a good many municipalities. Yet, the public utilities 
in most communities are provided by regulated private 
corporations. In any event, it is clear that the 
collection and disposition of sewage is typically a 
~
municipal service fairly comparable to police and fire --------., 
protection, the provision of streets, etc. CA7 summarized 
its view with respect to authorization as follows: 
"We hold that any municipality acting pursuant \ 
to 11clearly articulated and affirmatively ' 
expressed state policy which evidences an intent 
of the legislature to displace competition with 
regulation whether compelled, directed, 
authorized, or in the form of prohibition - is 
entitled to anti trust immunity because conduct 
pursuant to such policy would constitute state 
action. (J.A. 35-36) ." 
7. 
The amicus brief on behalf of a number of states 
argues flatly that we should adopt a "municipal action 
test" that recognizes the practicalities of the 
relationship between states and localities, and require 
only that the conduct of the municipality is within a 
clearly authorized and expressed state policy. 
* * * 
I joined the opinions in City of Lafayette and 
Boulder. In those cases private entities were directly 
affected. In Lafayette the city was competing with 
private enterprise, and in Boulder the city was granting a 
monopoly to a private corporation. Here, by contrast, 
only public bodies are involved, and the state policy is 
far more explicit than in either Lafayette or Boulder. At 
least where the city does not compete directly with 
private enterprise, and where the activity of the city is 
clearly authorized by state law, I am inclined to agree 
with CA7 and affirm. This would be some extension of 
Parker v. Brown but I believe it would be justified. A 
different rule would have a drastic adverse effect on 
state/municipal relations, and also could result in treble 
damage judgments against municipalities to the 
disadvantage of taxpayers. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Tb: Mr. Justice Powell November 21, 1984 
From: Lynda 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie, et al. v. City of Eau Claire 
Question Presented 
Whether the state action exemption to the --
antitrust laws applies to a municipality whosj e 
anticompetitive actions are authorized--not r.._  _.......,'- compelled--by 
the State, and where the State has not engaged in active 
supervision of the anticompetitive municipal function? 
2. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §66.069(2) (c) provides that a city ,......-
a city has no obligation to serve beyond that area. It 
provides in relevant part as follows: 
[E]ach •.. city may by ordinance fix the limits 
of such service in unincorporated areas. Such 
ordinance shall delineate the area within which 
service will be provided and the municipal utility 
shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area 
so delineated ..•• 
~~ 
In addition, §144.07(lm) provides that the department of 
""" . 
natural resources may order a city to extend its sewerage - - ·----~ ·----- -· -
~· ,, 
system to a town, but if that town refuses to become annexed 
to the city, the order becomes void and the city has no -
obligation to extend the sewerage system. The 
constitutionality of this provision was upheld in City of 
Ieloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis.2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342 (1977). 
B. Facts and Decisions Below 
Petrs are four Wisconsin townships ( the "Towns") 
adjacent to resp (the "City") . The City used federal funds 
to build a sewage treatment facility that is the only__~ 
available in the area. The City refuses to sell sewag~.a ,...-:J!ib, 
treatment services to the Towns, but sells them only to ~-
 
individual landowners if they agree to become annexed by the~
City. The Towns filed suit in DC against the City under the 
3. 
Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. §1 et seq., seeking injunctive relief 
a1d alleging, inter alia, that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment 
sewage collection and 
to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
transportation services. . The ~ 
dismiss~d _t~ comEl~nt on the ground that the City's 
... -._..--
conduct was protected state action exempt from the antitrust 
laws. CA7 (Eschbach, Coffey, and Wisdom [CAS, by 
designation]) affirmed. The court found that Wisconsin 
I[ "....._ 
statutes and case law showed that the State had authorized 
the City to provide sewage treatment services and to limit 
the areas it would serve. From this, the court was willing 
to assume the State contemplated that anticompetitive 
~fects might result. This was sufficient evidence of state 
a:::tion to satisfy the Parker v. Brown test. CA7 rejected 
~trs' contention that the requirement of California Retail 
Uquor Dealers' Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 
(1980) , that the State actively supervise the 
anticompetitive conduct, must be applied to municipal 
action. 
C. Relevant Case Law 
In Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943), the Court 
held that the Sherman Act was intended to be a broad 
prohibition on private restraints on trade; it did not 
prohibit a State as sovereign from imposing certain 
anticompetitive restraints as an act of government. 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar , 4 21 u . S • 7 7 3 ( 19 7 5) , 
4. 
underscored Parker's holding that the applicability of the 
state action exemption depends on whether the challenged 
action was a government act by the State as sovereign. In 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 u.s. 350, 362 (1977), the 
Court reaffirmed the necessity of the presence of a 
sovereign act, and held that the State policy requiring the 
anticompeti ti ve restraint must have been "clearly and 
affirmatively expressed" and that the restraint must be 
actively supervised by the State. 
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Light & Power 
co., 435 u.s. 389, 413 (1978), a plurality of the Court 
extended the state action exemption to actions of cities 
that reflect "state policy to displace competition with -----
regulation or monopoly public service." The plurality ruled 
that the city need not necessarily "point to a specific, 
detailed legislative authorization before it properly may 
assert a Parker defense to an antitrust suit." !d., at 415. 
Rather, "an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive 
activities of cities .•• exists when it is found 'from the 
authority given a governmental entity to operate in a 
particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind 
of action complained of.'" Id. (quoting the lower court's 
opinion, 532 F.2d, at 434). 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97, 105 (1980), the Court, 
in an opinion by you~led that California's wine pricing 
system was not immunized under the state action doctrine -----------
5. 
from the antitrust laws because although there was a clear 
legislative policy to permit resale liquor price 
maintenance, the State failed to satisfy the second prong of 
the test, which required active state supervision of the 
~~ . k ---.. 
anticompetitive activity. The State simply authorized price 
,.t..· -
setting and enforced the prices established by private 
parties; it neither established the prices itself nor 
reviewed the reasonableness of the prices set. Id., at 105. 
In Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 (1982), the Court ruled that a general 
"Home Rule Amendment" to ·the State Constitution did not 
~--------------_, _____ '-________ ___ 
constitute the "clear articulation and affirmative 
expression" of a State policy to authorize anticompeti ti ve 
conduct that was required by the state action doctrine. 
Rather, the Home Rule Amendment, in generally allocating 
authority to the municipality to govern local affairs, was 
reutral on the policy to be adopted concerning the 
regulation of cable television; hence, there was no state 
action--not even interaction of state and local regulation, 
rut only action by the City. Id., at 55. Because the city 
could not pass the "clear articulation" test, the Court 
___.....,__. ~ -- - -::=.:, 
expressly refused to rule on whether governmental action by 
a municipality must also satisfy the "active state 
supervision" requirement set forth in Midcal. Id., at 51-




This case presents ~wo q~tiQ!lS: (1) how clearly 
must a State express its policy requiring a municipal 
government to engage in anticompetitive activity, and (2) 
whether such anticompetitive activity by a municipality must 
be "actively supervised" by the State. I believe CA7 
reached the correct result on both issues, and I recommend 
that you vote to affirm. 
A. Expression of State Policy 
Appellants argue that the requirement that the 
State "clearly articulate[] and affirmatively express[]" its 
policy to displace competition with anticompetitive conduct 
requires that "the words or history of the State statutes 
clearly indicate the legislature actually had contemplated 
the displacement of competition." (Appellants' Brief, at 
22.) This argument is unsupported by the case law and makes 
no practical sense. As noted above, the plurality opinion 
in City of Lafayette stated that a municipality need not 
point to specific legislative authorization of its activity 
to maintain a Parker v. Brown defense. Rather, all that is 
necessary is evidence that the State authorized the 
municipality to operate in the particular area. 435 u.s., 
at 415. Such evidence is amply provided here by the 
Wisconsin statutes cited above, which directly authorize the 
City to provide sewage services and to limit the area in 
7. 
which it will provide them. Appellants' request for a 
requirement that the State legislature have explicitly 
contemplated the anticompetitive effect embodies an 
unrealistic view of the way legislatures work. Legislatures 
simply cannot be expected, in the course of enacting a 
&atute, to catalogue all of the anticipated effects the new 
law might have. 
Appellants contend that Wisconsin's position as to 
the anticompetitive activity here is strictly neutral, since 
the legislature nowhere expressed the view that the sewage 
treatment statutes would result in an anticompetitive 
effect. The Wisconsin statutes are not analogous, however, 
m the Home Rule Amendment to the state constitution in City 
cr Boulder, which this Court found to be a neutral statute. 
The Home Rule Amendment was a general allocation of 
authority to the municipality to regulate local affairs: it 
did not mention the policy to be adopted vis a vis the 
regulation of cable television. Hence, this Court found 
that it was neutral as to the anticompetitive activity 
alleged. The Wisconsin statutes at issue here, in contrast, 
deal specifically with the regulation of sewage treatment 
services, and expressly authorize the City to provide the 
services and to limit the areas it will serve. No 
reasonable argument can be made that these statutes are 




The SG argues that municipalities sho 1 
treated differently from private persons for purposes of the ~ 
state action exemption because they, unlike private persons, 
---------- --are arms of the State. Consequently, there is not the same 
need to require that the State have "compelled" the 
municipalities to engage in the anticompetitive activity 
pursuant to State policy, as there is in the case of a 
private individual seeking the state action exemption. 
This argument is eminently sensible. If the State 
has "clearly articulated" by way of statute its policy to 
have the municipality act in a particular area, with 
concomitant anticompetitive effects, evidence of 
"compulsion" is unnecessary for a reviewing court to be sure 
that the municipality is acting according to State policy. 
The states customarily delegate authority to local 
governments, and the municipality may fairly be assumed to 
' -------~-----------
act as an arm of the State in exercising such authority. 
Private persons, on the other hand, may be presumed to act 
primarily for their own interests, and so, this Court has 
held that "compulsion" by the State compelling their conduct 
is necessary before the state action exemption will apply. 
See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, supra, 421 u.s., at 790-
791; Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 u.s. 579, 592-593 
(1976) . 
Finally, the Court has recognized before that 
municipalities might be treated differently from private 
parties for purposes of the state action exemption. See 
~ 
9. 
City of Lafayette, supra, 435 u.s., at 411 n. 40; City of 
Boulder, supra, 455 u.s., at 51-52 n. 14. An additional 
reason for so holding here may be provided by a recent 
Congressional enactment, the Local Government Antitrust Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544 (Oct. 24, 1984)' which provides 
tYUW 
~ 1--u{ 
in §4(a) that "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs or~
attorneys fees may be recovered under" the Clayton Act in 
any action against a local government. This enactment is 
,,.--~-
not relevant to this case, since the appellants asked only 
.z::... ·- ...._____...... , ..--- '- ~ -
for injunctive relief, and the Conference Committee's Joint 
Explanatory Statement states that Congress intended for the 
Buker v. Brown doctrine to continue to apply. (See 
Appellants' Reply Brief, App. 4.) The bill does indicate, 
however, that Congress perceives a reason for treating 
private persons and municipalities differently in this area 
of the law, and adds support for a decision by this Court so 
holding. 
B. Active State Supervision 
Judge Wisdom ruled that there is no need to 
require the municipality's 
actions, in the same way that Midcal suggested private 
parties must be supervised. This is so for many of the same 
reasons offered above for why municipalities should be 
treated differently from private parties for purposes of the 
state action exemption. As noted above, the Court expressly 
left this issue open in City of Boulder, supra, 455 u.s., at 
10. 
51-52 n. 14, in which it refused to decide whether a 
municipality is required to meet this test. For the reasons 
given by Judge Wisdom and the SG, I conclude that active 
state supervision is not required where municipalities are 
involved. Once there is a clear statement by the State of 
its policy to authorize the municipality to engage in the 
activity in question, supervision is unnecessary as a means 
of proof that the municipality is carrying out an act of the 
sovereign, as it might be in the case of a private person. 
Moreover, as Judge Wisdom noted, requiring state supervision 
of municipal action endangers local autonomy and home rule 
authority, without producing a concomitant gain in 
enforceability of the state action doctrine. 
Conclusion 
This Court's op1n1ons have never required that 
~viote ~ and t milnic~ be treated identically 
for purposes of the state action exemption from the 
ffititrust laws. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette 
stated that a legislature need only authorize a municipality 
to act in a particular area to satisfy the "clear 
articulation" prong of the test: requiring specific 
contemplation of anticompetitive effects is not warranted by 
the cases and is contrary to the realities of legislative 
practice. Requiring the State to compel the municipality's 
action and to actively supervise it are likewise not 
11. 
mandated by the cases, and would seriously erode local 
autonomy for no good reason. I therefore recommend that you 
affirm. 
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cc: The Conference 
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January 2, 1985 
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Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . B REN NAN, J R . 
~nprtmt C4cu:rt of tlft ~ ~taUs­
'Jfulfittghnt. ~. <!f. 2ll&f'!~ 
January 2, 1985 
Re: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
No.82-1832 
Dear Lewis, 
I must say initially that I am quite happy with your draft 
opinion in this case and fully intend to join. You deal 
admirably with an evolving body of precedent that has at times 
been perceived by commentators as little more than a collection 
of results in search of a consistent rationale. But because of 
my past involvement with some of our prior decisions in this 
area, I hope you will indulge me in making a few comments. 
First, I wonder if our holding in City of Lafayette could 
not be more precisely described. Lafayette was decided in the 
face of opposing arguments that municipalities, as subdivisions 
of states, somehow derived total immunity from the federal 
antitrust laws "simply by reason of their status" as governmental 
entities. 435 u.s.,at 408. We properly rejected that argument, 
noting that in our prior decisions involving subsidiary state 
governmental bodies rather than the state itself, such as 
Goldfarb and Bates, we did not automatically find a state action 
exemption. Instead, we consistently had focused on whether the 
anticompetitive state policy allegedly being carried out by the 
state agency was "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" and whether that policy was "actively supervised" by 
the state. Id., at 410. Would not that passing description of 
our prior holdings be more accurately described as dictum, rather 
than as the "test" or holding of Lafayette as your draft might be 
read to suggest at pages 4 and 10? I had thought that the 
statement that was actually central to the result in Lafayette is 
that appearing at page 413 in the opinion, where we wrote that 
"the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged 
in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its 
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition 
" This is entirely consistent with your discussion and 
result in Hallie, and I believe a careful reading of Lafayette 
provides more clarity than perhaps subsequent readers have 
discerned. The issue of active supervision clearly was not 
decided in Lafayette, and consequently was, I think, properly 
noted as an open question in Boulder. 455 u.s., at 51 n.l4. 
While this is simply a matter of tone, could you find some way to 
recast your brief descriptions of Lafayette, since I really do 
not think that my plurality opinion there was inconsistent in any 
sense with your Hallie? 
- "' -
Second, simply in the interests of clarity, do you think 
that you should note on page 4 that in 'Midcal, (you will recall 
that I did not participate in that one), the original action was 
one of mandamus with an injunction running against a state 
agency, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
and not a private party? The California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association brought the case here on cert as a party intervenor. 
Of course, the mere presence of a state agency in the case was 
not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from that 
appropriate in a private party case. The California Supreme 
Court had expressly found that "the state plays no role whatever 
in setting the retail [liquor] prices" at issue, 445 U.S., at 100 
(quoting 21 Cal. 3d, at 445), and we also stated that "[t]he 
State has no direct control over wine prices, and it does not 
review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers." 
445 U.S., at 100. I suggest a clarifying note only because it 
seems to me that these facts may be important in distinguishing 
Midcal from this case, as well as from the scheme which we are 
about to approve in Southern Motor Carriers. 
Third, we held in Boulder that local autonomy and federalism 
concerns were insufficient to extend state action immunity to 
"horne rule" municipal governance systems. 455 U.S., at 53-54. 
Thus, with reference to your footnote 8 on page 11, a state 
"tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate" is no reason in itself to fail to scrutinize municipal 
actions under the federal antitrust laws. Also, I wonder if we 
should not refrain from commenting on the wisdom of the political 
decisions of states vis a vis governance of their local 
subdivisions? In sum;-I-wonder if footnote 8 should be deleted? 
If not, what would you think of altering the footnote to read 
somewhat as follows (changes underlined): 
"Once a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
state policy is discerned, further requiring States 
actively to supervise municipal conduct might be unwise 
as well as unnecessary. [next sentence and citation 
unchanged.] To require ongoing supervision by the 
State might well erode local autonomy and [omit 
possibly] limit the State's ability to focus on more 
general matters of statewide concern, to a greater 
extent than is required for effective admlnistration of 
the federal antitrust laws." 
Similar concerns also lead me to ask whether, in the first 
sentence of the second full paragraph on page 8, the phrase 
"would be unwise" should be replaced with "could lead to 
deleterious and unncessary consequences." 
Finally, as I stated at Conference, there are at least two 
other factors that contribute to my view that municipalities 
should be treated differently to some degree from private parties 
in the state action area. First, municipalities in many states 
must conduct their activities in view of the public eye, under 
- 3 -
"sunshine" laws or their equivalent; even absent such express 
laws, municipal conduct invariably is likely to be exposed to 
public view and scrutiny. Thus there is less reason to require 
ongoing state involvement, since the state will presumably become 
aware of deviations from its clearly expressed policies and take 
action to correct such deviations. (Moreover, I presume that if 
a deviation from clearly expressed state policy was clear, the 
municipality would lose whatever derivative state action 
exemption it might otherwise claim.) Second, unlike most 
corporate actors, the persons running a municipality are checked 
through the local electoral process. While this process does not 
entirely assure "pure" motives on the part of municipal actors 
(since the electors will in many cases be the same persons who 
presumably benefit from parochial anticompetitive policies), I 
think the political process is, in general, a more open system 
likely to provide some greater degree of protection against 
antitrust abuses. These factors, and perhaps others, could be 
added to your discussion at pages 9-10 as additional reasons why 
"we may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the 
municipality acts in the public interest." 
As I say, these matters, while not unimportant, are 
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January 28, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Justice Powell requested that I write a memorandum 
to you, informing you that he has read Justice Brennan's 
letter of January 2, 1985, proposing some changes to the 
opinion in this case. Justice Powell views these changes as 
consistent with the rationale of the opinion, and proposes 
to incorporate them in his draft, provided the Justices who 
have already joined the opinion find Justice Brennan's pro-
posals to be acceptable. If this suggestion meets with your 
approval, the changes will be incorporated and a revised 
draft circulated within a few days. 
l~~<:,~ 
Lynda Guild Simpson 
Law Clerk to Justice Powell 
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Dear Lewis: 
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No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Attention: Linda Guild Simpson 
Dear Lewis, 
I think Bill Brennan's suggestions are generally 
quite useful and that they will be helpful if incorporated 
in the opinion with one exception. I was in dissent in 
Boulder and am uncomfortable with the final underlined 
portion of Bill's amendment to footnote 8. Would it be 
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Dear Lewis: 
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Justice Powell 
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12.~~ 
t/to-11 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lee & Lynda 
Re: No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
No. 82-1922 - Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. 
v. u.s. 
As you requested, we have reviewed both of these 
opinions to be sure that each is consistent with the other. A 
new draft of each is attached so that you may read them together. 
~
The Southern Motor Carriers draft incorporates most of the 
~~:~
changes you requested. The Town of Hallie draft incorporates not 
-~ 
only changes to conform to Southern Motor Carriers, but also the 
proposals advanced by Justice Brennan. Because we have not yet ~;( ~ 
received responses from all of the Justices who had previously ~ ~ 
voted to join Hallie, the new draft has not been circulated. ~~ 
We would like to call your attention specifically~o ~ ~ 
new footnote 3 in Town of Hallie, which clarifies the procedu
-~
posture of the Midcal case. Justice Brennan had wanted us to add 
the note to Hallie to clarify the point that although Midcal had 
been brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a 
state agency, in fact the case had to be analysed as a case 
involving state regulation of private parties. Justice Brennan 
believed, and rightly so, that this distinction is important both 
(i) to explain why Midcal is distinguishable from Hallie, and 
(ii) to clarify our analysis in Southern Motor Carriers and 
J):,d...~ '1 141. ~ g 
~ H( 
explain why CAS was mistaken in holding that Midcal did not apply 
to the rate bureau case. To this end, we have not incorporated 
all of your changes to the Southern Motor Carriers draft, but 
have done the best we could to make both Southern Motor Carriers 
and Hallie clear in their own right, while consistent with each 
other. We hope you approve. 
The other point of note with respect to Hallie is old 
fo~tn~. Justice Brennan had suggested that it either be 
deleted or changed according to language he suggested. Justice 
O'Connor then objected to part of the proposed new language 
because of her dissent in City of Boulder. Justice Rehnquist 
agreed with Justice O'Connor. We concluded that it might be 
easiest to delete footnote 8, since it is far from central to the 
t 'x\w:s- ................ 
opinion. Rory tells us that he believes Justice Brennan would be 
just as happy with that course. If you would like to leave some 
remnant of footnote 8 in, however, let us know, and we will be 
glad to try to work some resolution. Copies of Justice Brennan's 
and Justice O'Connor's letters are attached for your information, 
as well as the previous draft of Hallie for comparison. 
Now that most your comments have been incorporated, the 
Southern Motor Carriers opinion is more narrow, and we believe 
greatly improved. We did not make a few of the changes that you 
suggested, however, and would like to offer a brief explanation 
for our failure to do so. You correctly point out that every 
member of the Court has not adopted Justice Stewart's statement 
in Cantor that Parker immunity should extend to private parties. 
See page 7 of the SMCRC draft. You suggested that we add a 
footnote describing Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Cantor, 
in which he states that Parker should be limited to cases in 
which a state official is the named defendant. We believe, 
however, that s~h :., dis;.us~~r~bl,;_.::us~ces Brennan 
-~ ~ 
and MaLshall. Although they joined Justice Stevens' ill-
--= -.... 
considered opinion in Cantor, they are willing to adopt our 
position in this case. (Only Justice ~evens and Justice~ite _.... 
are dissenting). They might find it troubling if their 
inconsistency is highlighted in the Court's opinion. Rory, who 
is handling this case for Justice Brennan, has told us that 
Justice Brennan is particularly concerned about the seemingly 
irreconcilable positions that he has taken in several of the 
state-action immunity cases. If you nevertheless think that we 
should discuss briefly Justice Stevens' Cantor opinion, we can do 
so easily. ;l/J . J ~44. ... ~ ~-~ ~~ •• ~, • 
We hope that you will approve of Section IV, B. We 
firmly believe that Mississippi's clear intent to displace 
competition among motor common carriers is enough to satisfy the 
first prong of the Midcal test. If you think that more than a 
intent to displace competition should be required, however, 
we think that the case should be remanded with respect to SMCRC's 
actions in Mississippi. 
You pointed out that for decades common carriers have 
been submitting collective rate proposals to the Mississippi 
Public Service Commission. While this probably is true, we are ~ 
for two reasons reluctant to assert that the first prong of the 4f~t~ 
Midcal test has been satisfied by implicit legislative 
ratification of collective ratemaking. First, there is nothing 
in the record indicating how long common carriers in Mississippi 
have engaged in collective ratemaking. ' second, as far as we 
know, there has never even been a regulation in Mississippi 
approving of this anticompetitive practice. The state 
legislature certainly is less likely to be aware of agency's 
policy if that policy is not set forth in regulations. 
Therefore, it is difficult to argue in this case that a long 
history of collective ratemaking in Mississippi shows that the 
practice is authorized by the State as sovereign. It is worth 
noting that even the CAS dissenters were unwilling to state that 
Mississippi had a clearly articulated policy in favor of 
collective ratemaking. Furthermore, there is some danger in 
suggesting that the actions of private parties, if taken over a 
long period of time, are entitled automatically to Parker 
immunity. The Court certainly does not want to establish a 
"grandfather clause" in the state action immunity area. 
We have eliminated most of the references to "private / 
parties" in the opinion. We think it is important, however, that 
the opinion clearly state that the Midcal test is applicable when 
a private party is the defendant. If the availability of Parker 
immunity is to depend on the nature of the activity rather than 
.... - . ... the identity of the defendant, Midcal's reach must be extended in 
this manner. 
~ hope that you will find our "twin opinions" ) 
satisfactory. We are, of course, ready to incorporate any 
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Dear Lewis, 
I join with pleasure your 4th draft 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis, 
February 13, 1985 
No. 82-1832 \ 
Town of Hallie, et al. ~ 
v. City of Eau Claire 
I wonder if at page 5 you have 
unintentionally repeated a line. At the end of 
line 7 you state "we declined to accept City of 
Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must 
show more than a state policy to displace 
competition exists. We .••. " Should that not 
be omitted in light of what you say at the end of 
the paragraph, to wit: "we declined to decide 
whether governmental action by a municipality must 
also be actively supervised by the State"? 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 19, 1985 
Re: No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
lgs March 22, 1985 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
This case presents the question whether the City of Eau 
Claire, Wisconsin is exempt from the Sherman Act under the state 
action doctrine of Parker v. Brown. For the reasons stated in an 
opinion filed with the Clerk today, we hold that it is. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is 
affirmed by a unanimous Court. 
lgs March 25, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Cases held for No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire 
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to the 
Conference on the cases that were held for Town of Hallie. As 
you will see, 1 recommend that you vote to deny in all of the 
--------------------~ 
cases, as it appears in each one that the Court of Appeals 
anticipated (i) the standard we would apply for determining when 
a State's policy has been clearly articulated, and (ii) the fact 
that we would not require active state supervision where 
municipal conduct was involved. 
This is the first such letter 1 have prepared for you, 
' 
so be sure to let me know if it does not conform either to the 
form or substance you prefer. 
March 25, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
We held five cases pending our disposition of No. 82-
1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. 
Gold Cross Ambulance v. Kansas City, et al., No. 83-
138: Resp Ambulance Service, Inc. ("AS!") is the only company 
allowed by resp Kansas City to provide ambulance services in 
Kansas City. All of the stock of AS! is owned by a municipal 
trust. Petrs are two ambulance companies that are denied access 
to most of the Kansas City market. They sued resps, alleging 
violations of the state and federal antitrust laws. The DC 
dismissed the antitrust claims. 
CA8 affirmed, ruling that the Sherman Act claims were 
barred under Parker v. Brown. CA8 found that Missouri had 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy 
authorizing the City to provide ambulance service to its 
residents by means of a single provider. CA8 rejected petrs' 
contention that the State must compel the anticompetitive 
conduct, ruling that only contemplation or authorization by the 
State was necessary. CA8 also rejected petrs' contention that 
there was no active state supervision, ruling that such 
supervision was not necessary where a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct was at issue. 
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it 
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became clear that Hoover would not decide the compulsion and 
state supervision claims where municipal conduct was at issue. 
Because CA8 appears to have properly anticipated our decision in 
Town of Hallie, I would deny cert in this case. 
Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metr. 
Area Solid Waste Agency, et al., No. 83-825: Resp Des Moines and 
several neighboring municipalities entered into a cooperative 
venture for the collection of waste. In order to finance a 
municipal landfill, the municipalities formed resp Solid Waste 
Agency, issued bonds, and agreed to use the landfill as the 
exclusive site of solid waste disposal. Petr runs a private 
landfill. Petr is not allowed to dispose of refuse collected 
within resps' area in its landfill. Petr sued, arguing that the 
municipalities' arrangement violated the Sherman Act. The DC 
dismissed the action, and CA8 affirmed. 
CA8 ruled that the Iowa legislature had authorized the 
challenged municipal activity and had intended that the 
municipalities would replace competition with regulation or some 
form of monopoly public service. CA8 also held there was no need 
for the municipalities to show active state supervision because 
their conduct is in an area of traditional municipal activity. 
In so holding, CA8 relied on its decision in Gold Cross Ambulance 
(No. 83-138--see above discussion). 
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it 
became clear that Hoover would not decide the claims presented 
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here relating to municipal conduct under the state action 
doctrine. Because it appears that CA8 properly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
Scott, et al. v. Sioux City, Iowa, et al., No. 84-360: 
Petrs, land developers, bought 89 acres of land along the 
southern limits of resp Sioux City in 1962. In 1966, the City 
annexed the land and zoned it for commercial use. In 1971, the 
City received federal funds to assist it in an urban renewal 
project that had been in the works for nearly seven years. 
Pursuant to the Iowa Urban Renewal Law, the City planned to 
acquire and redevelop its run-down central business district. In 
1974, petrs announced plans to develop a regional shopping center 
onJ part of its land on the outskirts of town. Fearing that the 
shopping center would hinder its downtown renewal project, resps 
the City Council passed an ordinance barring construction of the 
shopping center. Petrs sued, alleging violations of the Sherman 
Act and a claim for damages under §1983. The DC granted summary 
judgment for the City, relying on CA8's opinion in Gold Cross 
Ambulance (No. 83-138--see above discussion). 
CA8 affirmed. It ruled that the Iowa Urban Renewal Law 
specifically authorized the City to zone petrs' land in a way 
that would help effectuate its urban renewal goals, and also 
authorized the City to do "any and all things necessary" to carry 
out those goals. Moreover, the statute authorized the City's 
cooperative relationship with the private developer it had chosen 




that the legislature had contemplated the selective zoning at 
issue here. CAB also ruled that active state supervision was 
unnecessary. 
Because CAB appears to have correctly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
Golden State Transit Corp v. City of Los Angeles, No. 
B4-37B: Petr operated a taxicab company in resp City. Taxicab 
operators must have a franchise granted by the City, and the City 
Council makes the ultimate decision on whether to grant an 
application. In 19BO, all of the franchises expired and all 
holders, including petr, applied for renewal. The City Council 
denied petr's application. 
Petr sued, alleging that the City had violated the 
Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal Constitution. 
The DC granted the City partial summary judgment on the antitrust 
claim under Parker v. Brown. CA9 affirmed. It ruled that the 
City was required to show a state policy to displace competition 
with regulation and to show that the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action alleged to be anticompetitive. It found those 
requirements to be met by the Passenger Charter-Party Carriers' 
Act. CA9 also ruled that the City need not show active 
supervision by the State. 
Because CA9 appears to have correctly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
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Hybud Equipment Corp., et al. v. City of Akron, Ohio, 
et al., No. 84-832: Petrs are private firms that have for years 
competed in the waste disposal and recycling business in resp 
City and surrounding areas. In 1976, the City decided to build 
its own facility to recycle waste. An Ohio state agency, the 
Ohio water Development Authority ("OWDA"), issued revenue bonds 
to finance the project. An ordinance was enacted requiring all 
solid waste collected within city limits to be transported to the 
city facility and requiring a "tipping fee," to be set by the 
City, to be paid to the facility for accepting the waste. Petrs 
sued, arguing that the ordinance and related measures violated 
the Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal 
Constitution. The DC ruled for resps, holding that on the 
antitrust claims, resps' actions were exempt from liability under 
Parker v. Brown. 
CA6 affirmed, concluding that the statutes governing 
the OWDA issued a specific mandate to implement "the public 
policy of the State ••• to provide ••• efficient and proper 
methods of disposal, salvage, and reuse or recovery of resources 
from solid waste " In so holding, CA6 noted that the City 
was not required to point to a "specific, detailed legislative 
authorization," (quoting City of Lafayette), but that there must 
be evidence that the State authorized the municipality to act as 
it did and contemplated the kind of action that is alleged to be 
anticompetitive. 
Because CA6 properly anticipated our decision in Town 
of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire (Lynda~ 
LFP for the Court 12/10/84 
1st draft 12/20/84 
2nd draft 12/28/84 
3rd draft 1/7/85 
4th draft 2/12/85 
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Two copies to Mr. Lind 1/2/85 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~nvrtntt (ijll'Urt ttf t4t ~uittb ~talt.ll' 
Jla,gftiugton.~. (ij. 2.llgt~~ 
' 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 82-1832 Town of Hallie, et al v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~nvuuu ~o-url o-f tlrt 'J{nitth ~bttts 
'~lhnr.lfingto-n. ~. ~· 2.lT.;tJ!,;l 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 82-1832 - Town of Hallie, et al. 
v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Ju.prmu <!fqurl qf tlft 'Jttittb .Jta.tts 
._asftinghttt. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ1$ 
January 2, 1985 
Re: No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
,jttpTmtt <!fltltrl of t4t ~tth .ihttts 
:Jifaslfi:nghtn.!D. C!f. 2'!1,?'1~ 
January 2, 1985 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~nprtmt C!Jottrl ttf tlft ~~~ ~taft.&' 
~ltin¢ttn. ~. C!J. 20gt~;l 
January 2, 1985 
Re: 82-1832 -
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . B REN NAN, J R . 
~nprtmt C4cu:rt of tlft ~ ~taUs­
'Jfulfittghnt. ~. <!f. 2ll&f'!~ 
January 2, 1985 
Re: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
No.82-1832 
Dear Lewis, 
I must say initially that I am quite happy with your draft 
opinion in this case and fully intend to join. You deal 
admirably with an evolving body of precedent that has at times 
been perceived by commentators as little more than a collection 
of results in search of a consistent rationale. But because of 
my past involvement with some of our prior decisions in this 
area, I hope you will indulge me in making a few comments. 
First, I wonder if our holding in City of Lafayette could 
not be more precisely described. Lafayette was decided in the 
face of opposing arguments that municipalities, as subdivisions 
of states, somehow derived total immunity from the federal 
antitrust laws "simply by reason of their status" as governmental 
entities. 435 u.s.,at 408. We properly rejected that argument, 
noting that in our prior decisions involving subsidiary state 
governmental bodies rather than the state itself, such as 
Goldfarb and Bates, we did not automatically find a state action 
exemption. Instead, we consistently had focused on whether the 
anticompetitive state policy allegedly being carried out by the 
state agency was "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" and whether that policy was "actively supervised" by 
the state. Id., at 410. Would not that passing description of 
our prior holdings be more accurately described as dictum, rather 
than as the "test" or holding of Lafayette as your draft might be 
read to suggest at pages 4 and 10? I had thought that the 
statement that was actually central to the result in Lafayette is 
that appearing at page 413 in the opinion, where we wrote that 
"the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged 
in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its 
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition 
" This is entirely consistent with your discussion and 
result in Hallie, and I believe a careful reading of Lafayette 
provides more clarity than perhaps subsequent readers have 
discerned. The issue of active supervision clearly was not 
decided in Lafayette, and consequently was, I think, properly 
noted as an open question in Boulder. 455 u.s., at 51 n.l4. 
While this is simply a matter of tone, could you find some way to 
recast your brief descriptions of Lafayette, since I really do 
not think that my plurality opinion there was inconsistent in any 
sense with your Hallie? 
- "' -
Second, simply in the interests of clarity, do you think 
that you should note on page 4 that in 'Midcal, (you will recall 
that I did not participate in that one), the original action was 
one of mandamus with an injunction running against a state 
agency, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
and not a private party? The California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association brought the case here on cert as a party intervenor. 
Of course, the mere presence of a state agency in the case was 
not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from that 
appropriate in a private party case. The California Supreme 
Court had expressly found that "the state plays no role whatever 
in setting the retail [liquor] prices" at issue, 445 U.S., at 100 
(quoting 21 Cal. 3d, at 445), and we also stated that "[t]he 
State has no direct control over wine prices, and it does not 
review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers." 
445 U.S., at 100. I suggest a clarifying note only because it 
seems to me that these facts may be important in distinguishing 
Midcal from this case, as well as from the scheme which we are 
about to approve in Southern Motor Carriers. 
Third, we held in Boulder that local autonomy and federalism 
concerns were insufficient to extend state action immunity to 
"horne rule" municipal governance systems. 455 U.S., at 53-54. 
Thus, with reference to your footnote 8 on page 11, a state 
"tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate" is no reason in itself to fail to scrutinize municipal 
actions under the federal antitrust laws. Also, I wonder if we 
should not refrain from commenting on the wisdom of the political 
decisions of states vis a vis governance of their local 
subdivisions? In sum;-I-wonder if footnote 8 should be deleted? 
If not, what would you think of altering the footnote to read 
somewhat as follows (changes underlined): 
"Once a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
state policy is discerned, further requiring States 
actively to supervise municipal conduct might be unwise 
as well as unnecessary. [next sentence and citation 
unchanged.] To require ongoing supervision by the 
State might well erode local autonomy and [omit 
possibly] limit the State's ability to focus on more 
general matters of statewide concern, to a greater 
extent than is required for effective admlnistration of 
the federal antitrust laws." 
Similar concerns also lead me to ask whether, in the first 
sentence of the second full paragraph on page 8, the phrase 
"would be unwise" should be replaced with "could lead to 
deleterious and unncessary consequences." 
Finally, as I stated at Conference, there are at least two 
other factors that contribute to my view that municipalities 
should be treated differently to some degree from private parties 
in the state action area. First, municipalities in many states 
must conduct their activities in view of the public eye, under 
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"sunshine" laws or their equivalent; even absent such express 
laws, municipal conduct invariably is likely to be exposed to 
public view and scrutiny. Thus there is less reason to require 
ongoing state involvement, since the state will presumably become 
aware of deviations from its clearly expressed policies and take 
action to correct such deviations. (Moreover, I presume that if 
a deviation from clearly expressed state policy was clear, the 
municipality would lose whatever derivative state action 
exemption it might otherwise claim.) Second, unlike most 
corporate actors, the persons running a municipality are checked 
through the local electoral process. While this process does not 
entirely assure "pure" motives on the part of municipal actors 
(since the electors will in many cases be the same persons who 
presumably benefit from parochial anticompetitive policies), I 
think the political process is, in general, a more open system 
likely to provide some greater degree of protection against 
antitrust abuses. These factors, and perhaps others, could be 
added to your discussion at pages 9-10 as additional reasons why 
"we may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the 
municipality acts in the public interest." 
As I say, these matters, while not unimportant, are 





.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. 
.Jttptmu C!fourt of tlrt ~t~ .Statts 
._as!rington. ~. (!f. 2llc?~~ 
January 28, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Justice Powell requested that I write a memorandum 
to you, informing you that he has read Justice Brennan's 
letter of January 2, 1985, proposing some changes to the 
opinion in this case. Justice Powell views these changes as 
consistent with the rationale of the opinion, and proposes 
to incorporate them in his draft, provided the Justices who 
have already joined the opinion find Justice Brennan's pro-
posals to be acceptable. If this suggestion meets with your 
approval, the changes will be incorporated and a revised 
draft circulated within a few days. 
l~~<:,~ 
Lynda Guild Simpson 
Law Clerk to Justice Powell 
CHAMI!IERS Of" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
jlnpl-tm:t QJourt Df tlrt ~a .itatt• 
:¥iu~. ~. QI. 2ll.?'l-" 
January 29, 1985 
Re: No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBER S OF 
.J U STIC E SA N D RA DAY O'CO N NOR 
.tnvrttttt Q}ltltd qf tqt 1Juittb ;ibdt.tl' 
Jfaglfiugtou, ~. (!}. 2llbi~~ 
January 29, 1985 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Attention: Linda Guild Simpson 
Dear Lewis, 
I think Bill Brennan's suggestions are generally 
quite useful and that they will be helpful if incorporated 
in the opinion with one exception. I was in dissent in 
Boulder and am uncomfortable with the final underlined 
portion of Bill's amendment to footnote 8. Would it be 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
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January 29, 1985 
Re: No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iu.prttttt <!}ourt of tlrt 'J!btitt~ .ifahg 
'Jiagfringhtn. ~. <!}. 2ll&f~~ 
January 30, 1985 
Re: No. 82-1832-Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 
I have no objection to your accommodating the suggestions 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:8u:prttnt Qfltttrlaf tlrt 'J'nittb .:§tzdts 
.asfrin:gtott. ~. <!J. 2llp~,;l 
February 1, 1985 
Re: 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with Sandra's comments in her letter to you 
of January 29th. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
lgs/alb February 8, 1985 
12.~~ 
t/to-11 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lee & Lynda 
Re: No. 82-1832 - Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
No. 82-1922 - Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. 
v. u.s. 
As you requested, we have reviewed both of these 
opinions to be sure that each is consistent with the other. A 
new draft of each is attached so that you may read them together. 
~
The Southern Motor Carriers draft incorporates most of the 
~~:~
changes you requested. The Town of Hallie draft incorporates not 
-~ 
only changes to conform to Southern Motor Carriers, but also the 
proposals advanced by Justice Brennan. Because we have not yet ~;( ~ 
received responses from all of the Justices who had previously ~ ~ 
voted to join Hallie, the new draft has not been circulated. ~~ 
We would like to call your attention specifically~o ~ ~ 
new footnote 3 in Town of Hallie, which clarifies the procedu
-~
posture of the Midcal case. Justice Brennan had wanted us to add 
the note to Hallie to clarify the point that although Midcal had 
been brought as a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a 
state agency, in fact the case had to be analysed as a case 
involving state regulation of private parties. Justice Brennan 
believed, and rightly so, that this distinction is important both 
(i) to explain why Midcal is distinguishable from Hallie, and 
(ii) to clarify our analysis in Southern Motor Carriers and 
J):,d...~ '1 141. ~ g 
~ H( 
explain why CAS was mistaken in holding that Midcal did not apply 
to the rate bureau case. To this end, we have not incorporated 
all of your changes to the Southern Motor Carriers draft, but 
have done the best we could to make both Southern Motor Carriers 
and Hallie clear in their own right, while consistent with each 
other. We hope you approve. 
The other point of note with respect to Hallie is old 
fo~tn~. Justice Brennan had suggested that it either be 
deleted or changed according to language he suggested. Justice 
O'Connor then objected to part of the proposed new language 
because of her dissent in City of Boulder. Justice Rehnquist 
agreed with Justice O'Connor. We concluded that it might be 
easiest to delete footnote 8, since it is far from central to the 
t 'x\w:s- ................ 
opinion. Rory tells us that he believes Justice Brennan would be 
just as happy with that course. If you would like to leave some 
remnant of footnote 8 in, however, let us know, and we will be 
glad to try to work some resolution. Copies of Justice Brennan's 
and Justice O'Connor's letters are attached for your information, 
as well as the previous draft of Hallie for comparison. 
Now that most your comments have been incorporated, the 
Southern Motor Carriers opinion is more narrow, and we believe 
greatly improved. We did not make a few of the changes that you 
suggested, however, and would like to offer a brief explanation 
for our failure to do so. You correctly point out that every 
member of the Court has not adopted Justice Stewart's statement 
in Cantor that Parker immunity should extend to private parties. 
See page 7 of the SMCRC draft. You suggested that we add a 
footnote describing Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Cantor, 
in which he states that Parker should be limited to cases in 
which a state official is the named defendant. We believe, 
however, that s~h :., dis;.us~~r~bl,;_.::us~ces Brennan 
-~ ~ 
and MaLshall. Although they joined Justice Stevens' ill-
--= -.... 
considered opinion in Cantor, they are willing to adopt our 
position in this case. (Only Justice ~evens and Justice~ite _.... 
are dissenting). They might find it troubling if their 
inconsistency is highlighted in the Court's opinion. Rory, who 
is handling this case for Justice Brennan, has told us that 
Justice Brennan is particularly concerned about the seemingly 
irreconcilable positions that he has taken in several of the 
state-action immunity cases. If you nevertheless think that we 
should discuss briefly Justice Stevens' Cantor opinion, we can do 
so easily. ;l/J . J ~44. ... ~ ~-~ ~~ •• ~, • 
We hope that you will approve of Section IV, B. We 
firmly believe that Mississippi's clear intent to displace 
competition among motor common carriers is enough to satisfy the 
first prong of the Midcal test. If you think that more than a 
intent to displace competition should be required, however, 
we think that the case should be remanded with respect to SMCRC's 
actions in Mississippi. 
You pointed out that for decades common carriers have 
been submitting collective rate proposals to the Mississippi 
Public Service Commission. While this probably is true, we are ~ 
for two reasons reluctant to assert that the first prong of the 4f~t~ 
Midcal test has been satisfied by implicit legislative 
ratification of collective ratemaking. First, there is nothing 
in the record indicating how long common carriers in Mississippi 
have engaged in collective ratemaking. ' second, as far as we 
know, there has never even been a regulation in Mississippi 
approving of this anticompetitive practice. The state 
legislature certainly is less likely to be aware of agency's 
policy if that policy is not set forth in regulations. 
Therefore, it is difficult to argue in this case that a long 
history of collective ratemaking in Mississippi shows that the 
practice is authorized by the State as sovereign. It is worth 
noting that even the CAS dissenters were unwilling to state that 
Mississippi had a clearly articulated policy in favor of 
collective ratemaking. Furthermore, there is some danger in 
suggesting that the actions of private parties, if taken over a 
long period of time, are entitled automatically to Parker 
immunity. The Court certainly does not want to establish a 
"grandfather clause" in the state action immunity area. 
We have eliminated most of the references to "private / 
parties" in the opinion. We think it is important, however, that 
the opinion clearly state that the Midcal test is applicable when 
a private party is the defendant. If the availability of Parker 
immunity is to depend on the nature of the activity rather than 
.... - . ... the identity of the defendant, Midcal's reach must be extended in 
this manner. 
~ hope that you will find our "twin opinions" ) 
satisfactory. We are, of course, ready to incorporate any 
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Dear Lewis, 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis, 
February 13, 1985 
No. 82-1832 \ 
Town of Hallie, et al. ~ 
v. City of Eau Claire 
I wonder if at page 5 you have 
unintentionally repeated a line. At the end of 
line 7 you state "we declined to accept City of 
Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must 
show more than a state policy to displace 
competition exists. We .••. " Should that not 
be omitted in light of what you say at the end of 
the paragraph, to wit: "we declined to decide 
whether governmental action by a municipality must 
also be actively supervised by the State"? 
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cc: The Conference 
lgs March 22, 1985 
No. 82-1832 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
This case presents the question whether the City of Eau 
Claire, Wisconsin is exempt from the Sherman Act under the state 
action doctrine of Parker v. Brown. For the reasons stated in an 
opinion filed with the Clerk today, we hold that it is. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is 
affirmed by a unanimous Court. 
lgs March 25, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: Cases held for No. 82-1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire 
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to the 
Conference on the cases that were held for Town of Hallie. As 
you will see, 1 recommend that you vote to deny in all of the 
--------------------~ 
cases, as it appears in each one that the Court of Appeals 
anticipated (i) the standard we would apply for determining when 
a State's policy has been clearly articulated, and (ii) the fact 
that we would not require active state supervision where 
municipal conduct was involved. 
This is the first such letter 1 have prepared for you, 
' 
so be sure to let me know if it does not conform either to the 
form or substance you prefer. 
March 25, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
We held five cases pending our disposition of No. 82-
1832, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. 
Gold Cross Ambulance v. Kansas City, et al., No. 83-
138: Resp Ambulance Service, Inc. ("AS!") is the only company 
allowed by resp Kansas City to provide ambulance services in 
Kansas City. All of the stock of AS! is owned by a municipal 
trust. Petrs are two ambulance companies that are denied access 
to most of the Kansas City market. They sued resps, alleging 
violations of the state and federal antitrust laws. The DC 
dismissed the antitrust claims. 
CA8 affirmed, ruling that the Sherman Act claims were 
barred under Parker v. Brown. CA8 found that Missouri had 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy 
authorizing the City to provide ambulance service to its 
residents by means of a single provider. CA8 rejected petrs' 
contention that the State must compel the anticompetitive 
conduct, ruling that only contemplation or authorization by the 
State was necessary. CA8 also rejected petrs' contention that 
there was no active state supervision, ruling that such 
supervision was not necessary where a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct was at issue. 
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it 
- 2 -
became clear that Hoover would not decide the compulsion and 
state supervision claims where municipal conduct was at issue. 
Because CA8 appears to have properly anticipated our decision in 
Town of Hallie, I would deny cert in this case. 
Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metr. 
Area Solid Waste Agency, et al., No. 83-825: Resp Des Moines and 
several neighboring municipalities entered into a cooperative 
venture for the collection of waste. In order to finance a 
municipal landfill, the municipalities formed resp Solid Waste 
Agency, issued bonds, and agreed to use the landfill as the 
exclusive site of solid waste disposal. Petr runs a private 
landfill. Petr is not allowed to dispose of refuse collected 
within resps' area in its landfill. Petr sued, arguing that the 
municipalities' arrangement violated the Sherman Act. The DC 
dismissed the action, and CA8 affirmed. 
CA8 ruled that the Iowa legislature had authorized the 
challenged municipal activity and had intended that the 
municipalities would replace competition with regulation or some 
form of monopoly public service. CA8 also held there was no need 
for the municipalities to show active state supervision because 
their conduct is in an area of traditional municipal activity. 
In so holding, CA8 relied on its decision in Gold Cross Ambulance 
(No. 83-138--see above discussion). 
This case was originally held for Hoover v. Ronwin, No. 
82-1474, but was relisted and held for Town of Hallie after it 
became clear that Hoover would not decide the claims presented 
- 3 -
here relating to municipal conduct under the state action 
doctrine. Because it appears that CA8 properly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
Scott, et al. v. Sioux City, Iowa, et al., No. 84-360: 
Petrs, land developers, bought 89 acres of land along the 
southern limits of resp Sioux City in 1962. In 1966, the City 
annexed the land and zoned it for commercial use. In 1971, the 
City received federal funds to assist it in an urban renewal 
project that had been in the works for nearly seven years. 
Pursuant to the Iowa Urban Renewal Law, the City planned to 
acquire and redevelop its run-down central business district. In 
1974, petrs announced plans to develop a regional shopping center 
onJ part of its land on the outskirts of town. Fearing that the 
shopping center would hinder its downtown renewal project, resps 
the City Council passed an ordinance barring construction of the 
shopping center. Petrs sued, alleging violations of the Sherman 
Act and a claim for damages under §1983. The DC granted summary 
judgment for the City, relying on CA8's opinion in Gold Cross 
Ambulance (No. 83-138--see above discussion). 
CA8 affirmed. It ruled that the Iowa Urban Renewal Law 
specifically authorized the City to zone petrs' land in a way 
that would help effectuate its urban renewal goals, and also 
authorized the City to do "any and all things necessary" to carry 
out those goals. Moreover, the statute authorized the City's 
cooperative relationship with the private developer it had chosen 




that the legislature had contemplated the selective zoning at 
issue here. CAB also ruled that active state supervision was 
unnecessary. 
Because CAB appears to have correctly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
Golden State Transit Corp v. City of Los Angeles, No. 
B4-37B: Petr operated a taxicab company in resp City. Taxicab 
operators must have a franchise granted by the City, and the City 
Council makes the ultimate decision on whether to grant an 
application. In 19BO, all of the franchises expired and all 
holders, including petr, applied for renewal. The City Council 
denied petr's application. 
Petr sued, alleging that the City had violated the 
Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal Constitution. 
The DC granted the City partial summary judgment on the antitrust 
claim under Parker v. Brown. CA9 affirmed. It ruled that the 
City was required to show a state policy to displace competition 
with regulation and to show that the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action alleged to be anticompetitive. It found those 
requirements to be met by the Passenger Charter-Party Carriers' 
Act. CA9 also ruled that the City need not show active 
supervision by the State. 
Because CA9 appears to have correctly anticipated our 
decision in Town of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
- 5 -
Hybud Equipment Corp., et al. v. City of Akron, Ohio, 
et al., No. 84-832: Petrs are private firms that have for years 
competed in the waste disposal and recycling business in resp 
City and surrounding areas. In 1976, the City decided to build 
its own facility to recycle waste. An Ohio state agency, the 
Ohio water Development Authority ("OWDA"), issued revenue bonds 
to finance the project. An ordinance was enacted requiring all 
solid waste collected within city limits to be transported to the 
city facility and requiring a "tipping fee," to be set by the 
City, to be paid to the facility for accepting the waste. Petrs 
sued, arguing that the ordinance and related measures violated 
the Sherman Act and various provisions of the federal 
Constitution. The DC ruled for resps, holding that on the 
antitrust claims, resps' actions were exempt from liability under 
Parker v. Brown. 
CA6 affirmed, concluding that the statutes governing 
the OWDA issued a specific mandate to implement "the public 
policy of the State ••• to provide ••• efficient and proper 
methods of disposal, salvage, and reuse or recovery of resources 
from solid waste " In so holding, CA6 noted that the City 
was not required to point to a "specific, detailed legislative 
authorization," (quoting City of Lafayette), but that there must 
be evidence that the State authorized the municipality to act as 
it did and contemplated the kind of action that is alleged to be 
anticompetitive. 
Because CA6 properly anticipated our decision in Town 
of Hallie, I would vote to deny in this case. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1832 
.TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")--are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the City 
of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chip-
pewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau 
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in 
United States District Court for the Western District of Wis-
consin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City vio-
lated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a 
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in 
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provi-
sion of such services to the provision of sewage collection and 
1 The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
.. 
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transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had 
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facil-
ity within the Eau Claire Service Area, which included the 
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to 
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treat-
ment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to 
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of 
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to 
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection 
and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an uniawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a 
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are 
not at issue in this Court. 
.. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA 7 1983). It ruled that the 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
. rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result. 
The City's conduct thus constituted state action within the 
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also con-
cluded that in a case such as this involving "a local govern-
ment performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d, 
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker 
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prereq-
uisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the 
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of 
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in 
the state's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. !d., at 351. 
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on the 
other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by 
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sover-
eign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to 
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obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate 
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the 
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with 
regulation or monopoly public service." ld., at 413. Thus, 
a showing by the municipality that its anticompetitive activi-
ties were duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemp-
tion from Sherman Act liability. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded, 
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the StateC 435 G) 
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." ld., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply 
82-1832-0PINION 
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literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state pol-
icy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the 
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City 
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a munici-
pality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" compo-
nent of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is. therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to say that its anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left 
open the question whether action by a municipality-like ac-
tion by a private party-must satisfy the "active state super-
vision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at · 51-52, 
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to con-
struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant 
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that 
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the ,:g'tate's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partmei1t of Natural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
3 There is no such order of the Department of Nat ural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
'The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to 
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the conten-
tion. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, in-
cluding towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a gen-
eral enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In 
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all 
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of_ serv-
ice. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
(. e._. 
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. SeeN ew Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. · The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation'~ test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. 
~s Court has never required the degree of specificity that 
 th: Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at 
• Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
• Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would thwart 
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immuniz-
ing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)).7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a 
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, 
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts 
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, 
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own be-
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the CitY. to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be ~exempt from the 
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city. could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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half. Also, as we have concluded in another case decided to-
day, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States,-- U. S. --,a private party is not invari-
ably required to show compulsion where the state authoriza-
tion or approval is clear. 
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at 
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417, 
spoke in terms of the State's dir~ction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
tively expressed is good evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn .. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a 
municipality. 
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at 11-IO , the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to )3fate policy. In Midcal, we 
stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state in-
volvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than 
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
not a private party, but a municipality, there is little or no 
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrange-
ment. The only real danger is that it will seek to further 
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more over-
riding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, be"' 
cause of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that 
state authorization exists, there is no need to require the 
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of 
what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
1s case · the Sherman Act. They were taken 
pursuant to a c early articulated state policy to replace com-
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered . 
L"'n dtA. 5/Mf<:::.o 1\,.:..-
12/19 I_ 301 ;;_ 
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TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1984] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four 
Wisconsi~ownships located adjacent to respondent, the City 
of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chip-
pewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau 
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in 
United States District Court for the Western District of Wis-
consin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City vio-
lated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a 
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in 
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provi-
sion of such services to the provision of sewage collection and 
1 The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
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transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had 
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facil-
ity within the Eau Claire Service Area, ~ included the 
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to 
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treat-
ment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to 
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of 
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to 
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection 
and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a 
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are 
not at issue in this Court. 
; 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA 7 1983). It ruled that the 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that a~~ J.Jf!ects might result. ~~ 
e 1ty s conduct thus +«- state aM:fil!i within the 
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also con-
cluded that in a case such as this involving "a local govern-
ment performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d, 
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker 
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prereq-
uisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the 
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of 
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in 
the state's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. I d., at 351. · 
unicipalities aBel a6fl:er sttbelh i~ion~ of the Stat~ on the 
other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by 
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sover-
eign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to 
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obtain exemption, ~H*e&~JP'llll:J.Sl,l;mw must demonstrate 
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the 
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with 
regulation or monopoly public service." I d., at 413. ~ 
-a- showing by the m~::mieipality that its antieompetitive aeti v ~ 
ties were dnly anthorized by the State entitles it to exemp~ 
eon ft om Shennan Aet liability. a -
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded, 
the mm1icipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy'' that was "actively supervised" by the State~ 
U. S., at 410. The munit:ipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply 
• 
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iiteFall$ the,lgity of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state pol-
icy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the 
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City 
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a munici-
pality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" compo-
nent of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearl a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to that its anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left · 
open the question whether action by a municipality-like ac-
tion by a private party-must satisfy the "active state super-
vision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-52, 
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to con-
struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant 
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that 
a city operating a public utility 
6 
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the ,gtate's Department of Natural Resources may re- l.C!. . 
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partment of Natural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
3 There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
• The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to 
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the conten-
tion. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, in- ---
eluding towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a~-
eral enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription.  
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all 
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of. serv-
ice. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does § 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kinc,i of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
_____ authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. 
~ fo..d-OJ) 1?'rus Court has never required the degree of specificity that 
the Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at 
5 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
6 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter- ~V\~er-c.v. t 
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would~,..._,....--;-~ 
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of imruniz-
ing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
. .; 
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for~· 
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a 
municipality is an arm of. the State. We may presume, 
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts 
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, 
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own be-
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be ~empt from the 
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city.could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services . 
mo..y· b2. ~ best 
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half. l.dso, as w8l:J.a¥8 eeReh~aea iR aRetheF ease G8eiG8G tg ~ 
Gay, 8e'bl!the1 n Motor Carriers Rate Cunfol ertee, hte. v. · -
.f:htited States, U. 8. , a pti9ate pa1 ty is not invad- 2 -
ably Ieqaiied to show eompnl~ion whete the state antnodza Q..-
tioH et' approval i~ deai . a -
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at 
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417, 
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
Ive y expressed · evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a 
municipality. 
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at ~' the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to ,.g'tate policy. In Midcal, we 
stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state in-
volvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than 
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
· , a municipality, there is little or no 
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrange-
ment. The only real danger is that it will seek to further 
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more over-
. riding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, be-
cause of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that 
state authorization exists, there is no need to require the 
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of 
what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the Cit of Eau Claire in 
this case t e erman Act. T ey were taken 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace com-
petition in the provision of sewerage services with regula-
8 In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many ·ather 
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town o 
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls , Ta6 1,1fis. 2el 633,$39, 314 N. W. Bel 32~ 
To require active supervision by the ~tate would erode local 
~-au=-on:.,_om_ye~~:a-n"'l\d limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of 
statewide cone rn. 
/ 
l. c. . 
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the City 
of Eau Clalre (the "City"). Town of Hallie is located in Chip-
pewa County, and the other three towns are located in Eau 
Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against the City in 
United States District Court for the Western District of Wis-
consin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that the City vio-
lated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by acquiring a 
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services in 
Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provi-
sion of such services to the provision of sewage collection and 
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transportation services.2 Under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., the City had 
obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treatment facil-
ity within the Eau Claire Service Area, which included the -;r ~ 
Towns; the facility is the only one in the market available to 
the Towns. The City has refused to supply sewage treat-
ment services to the Towns. It does supply the services to 
individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a majority of 
the individuals in the area vote by referendum election to 
have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the City's sewage collection 
and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq. , and of a common law duty of a 
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are 
not at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result. 
The City's conduct thus constituted state action within the 
meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The court also con-
cluded that in a case such as this involving "a local govern-
ment performing a traditional municipal function," 700 F. 2d, 
at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for Parker 
immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a prereq-
uisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situation, the 
court believed, because it would erode traditional concepts of 
local autonomy and home rule that were clearly expressed in 
the state's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
·n 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting threugh its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. ld., at 351. · 
Municipalitiet:RQ ot:Ref' saeaivisioB~f t:Re ~tat~ on the 
other hand, are ot beyond the reach of the antitrust laws by 
virtue of their status because they are not themselves sover-
eign . . City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
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obtain exemption, peHtieal subdivisiofl~ must demonstrate ~ ~ 
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the "' ~
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with J ·,J_ lvr - 1 
regulation or monopoly public service." Id., at 413. Thus, 
a showing by the municipality that its anticompetitive activi-
ties were duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemp-
tion from Sherman Act liability. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded, 
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State, 435 
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply 
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literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state pol-
icy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to the 
regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the City 
could not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a munici-
pality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" compo-
nent of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to ~ that its anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. Moreover, we have expressly left 
open the question whether action by a municipality-like ac-
tion by a private party-must satisfy the "active state super-
vision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-52, 
n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to con-
struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant 
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that 
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"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
·area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partmeJ1t of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the citY. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do pot 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
3 There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
'The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to 
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the conten-
tion. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, in-
cluding towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a gen-
eral enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In 
addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all 
of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of serv-
ice. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regufu.tlJfy ~strrrcture-that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at ·issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
. ~ 
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provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. --4'35 ~u. S., at 434-435. 
This Court has never required the degree of specificity that 
the Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at 
6 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
6 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would t-ftw~ (" ~ ~ 
the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immuniz-
ing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
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415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a 
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, 
absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts 
in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, 
may be presumed to be acting -primarily on his or its own be-
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be be exempt from the 
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city.could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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half. Also, as we have concluded in another case decided to-
day, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States,-- U. S. --,a private party is not invari-
~-- ~quired to show compulsion where the state authoriza-
 v '-lUII(_Qy approval~lear. 
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at 
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417, 
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. Tnis is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
/'VJ.~hl 
1 
u _ A _ 1- tively expressed ioe ~od evidence of state policy, it is by no 
, ~ t 1.1-L r/!1.-V ~r means a prerequisite to a finding ~hat a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
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As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at --, the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to State policy. In Midcal, we 
stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting a ... gauzy cloak of state in-
volvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests rath than 
the governmental interests of the ~ere the actor is 
· , a municipalitJ(jJ. there is little or no 
danger that it is involved in a private pr1ce- ing arrange-
ment. The only real danger is that it will seek to further 
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more over-
riding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, be-
cause of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it is clear that 
. state authorization exists, there is no need to require the 
State to supervise actively the municipality's execution of 
what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case do not violate the Sherman Act. They were taken 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace com-
petition in the provision of sewerage services with regula-
8 In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many ·other 
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of 
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 539, 314 N. W. 2d 321, 
324 (1982). To require active supervision by the State would erode local 
autonomy and"'limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of 
statewide concern. 
I . ~ 
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tion. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four 
Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to re- J 
spondent, the City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of 
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three 
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed 
suit against the City in United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and 
alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 lJ. S. C. 
~et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sew-
~ ~g~ treatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Coun-
ties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi-
1 The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2 
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. 
§§ 1251, et seq., the City had obtained federal funds to help 
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Serv-
ice Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one I 
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the 
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by ref-
erendum election to have their homes annexed by the City, 
see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the 
City's sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and . transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a 
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are 
not at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result. 
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authori- ~ 
zation within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a 
local government performing a traditional municipal func-
tion," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnec-
essary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such super-
vision as a prerequisite to immunity woul~ also be unwise in 
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode tra-
ditional concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were 
clearly expressed in the state's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .leg-
islature. Id., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
I d., at 413. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely ~ormalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded; 
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State. 435 f 
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
. . . to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market -goals." I d., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply ,I 
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's I 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to 
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the 
City could not meet this requirement of the state action test, 
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" 
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. C~ty of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
. III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to con-
struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant 
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that 
a city operating a public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
6 
82-1832-0PINION 
HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the state's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partment of Natural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
3 There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
'The Towns also rely on§§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to 
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the con-
tention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, 
including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a 
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addi-
tion, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of 
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service. 
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does § 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
82-1832-0PINION 
HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE 7 
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. . It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. SeeN ew Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
82-1832-0PINION 
8 HALLIE v. EAU CLAIRE 
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the . delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In j 
fact, this Court has never requtled the degre·e of specificity 
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d 
5 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
6 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under- I 
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immu-
nizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
.. 
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for 
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private 
parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a munici-
pality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the 
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be 
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf. 
(. 
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court dis-
agreed, concludin that the le 'slature intended the City to undertake the 
c a enged actions. Those actions ~ t erefore exempt from the 
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at 
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417, 
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
tively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is 
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality 
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy . 
• 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor -is a 
municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, !ee B~l o:, at 9 lei the requirement of active state \ 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we 
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stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than 
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is l 
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved 
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger 
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests 
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger 
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the 
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no 
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipal-
ity's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
8 In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be un~se. Wisconsin, like many other 
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of 
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To 
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and 
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of state-
wide concern. 
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")-are four 
Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to re-
spondent, the City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of 
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three 
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed 
suit against the City in United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and 
alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sew-
age treatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Coun-
ties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi-
'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2 
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. 
§§ 1251, et seq., the City had obtained federal funds to help 
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Serv-
ice Area, that included the Towns; the facility is the only one 
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the 
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by ref-
erendum election to have their homes annexed by the City, 
see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1), and to use the 
City's sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-· 
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
state's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, et seq., and of a common law duty of a 
utility to serve. The district court dismissed these claims, and they are 
not at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that the 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that anticornpetitive effects might result. 
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authori-
zation within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a 
local government performing a traditional municipal func-
tion," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnec-
essary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such super-
vision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in 
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode tra-
ditional concepts of local autonomy and horne rule that were 
clearly expressed in the state's statutes. ' 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticornpetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .leg-
islature. I d., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
!d., at 413. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded, 
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ... state 
policy'' that was "actively supervised" by the State. 435 
U. S., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. I d., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." I d., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case; we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply 
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to 
the regulation of cable television in the locaie. Because the · 
City could not meet this requirement of the state action test, 
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" 
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" require'ment. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 62.18(1) grants authority to cities to con-
struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This grant 
of authority is supplemented by§ 66.069(2)(c), providing that 
a city operating a public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
6 
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municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the state's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partment of Natural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
3 There is no such order of the Department of Nat ural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
' The Towns also rely on §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 of the Wisconsin code to 
argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the con-
tention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain municipalities, 
including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a 
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addi-
tion, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of 
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service. 
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
82-1832-0PINION 
HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE 7 
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law 1!212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
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made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative his_tory that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. · 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In 
fact, this Court has never required the degree of specificity 
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F. 2d 
5 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
6 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under-
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immu-
nizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, § 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for 
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private 
parties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a munici-
pality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the 
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be 
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf: 
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The state supreme court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions would therefore be exempt from the 
state's antitrust laws. Analysing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 U. S., at 
56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 U. S., at 416-417, 
spoke in terms of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
tively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is 
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality 
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor ·is a 
municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at 9-10, the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we 
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stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting a . . . gauzy cloak of state 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." 445 U. S., at 106. Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests, ra.ther than 
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved 
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger 
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests 
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger 
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the 
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no 
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipal-
ity's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
8 In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other 
states, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of 
Hallie v. City ofChippewaFalls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To 
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and 
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This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Braum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), /when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
II 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
~ ~ Union, and Town of Washington (the ~own~are four 
Wisconsin unincorporated townships located adjacent to re- j 
Z?/ V./ spondent, the City of Eau Claire (the ~ityu,. Town of 
Hallie is located in Chippewa County, and the other three 
towns are located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed 
/ \ suit against the City in United States District Court for the 
/ t tc"' ' ) Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and 
' ~alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 lJ. S.C. 
et seq. ;'hy acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sew-
treatment services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Coun-
ties, and by tying the provision of such services to the provi-
1 The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
>5/ 
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sion of sewage collection and transportation services. 2 
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. 
j§ 125 et seq.~ the City had obtained federal funds to help 
build a sewage treatment facility within the Eau Claire Serv-
ice Area, that included the :rownsi the facility is the only one I 
in the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of the 
Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area vote by ref-
erendum electi~ have their homes annexed by the City, 1 
see Wis. Stat.~§§66.024(4)/144.07(1~~nd to use the (lq~J}f 
City's sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and . transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
'tate's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications ~~~Uz..i( 
1 The complaint also all~ed violations of the Federal Water Pollution IK 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. }§ 125~et seq., and of a commonAlaw duty of a :' J I S££ 
utility to serve. The p'istrict oourt dismissed these claims, and they are D fG ~ 
not at issue in this Court. r ;, ~ 
S', 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982),~nd Parker v. 
Brown, supra. / Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (~1983). / lt ruled that the ~ / 
Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and to refuse to provide such services to unincorpo-
rated areas. The court therefore assumed that the State 
had contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result. 
The City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authori-~ 
zation within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. - The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a 
local government performing a traditional municipal func-
tion, "..J'lOO F. 2d, at 384, :ictive state supervision was unnec-
essary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such super-
vision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in 
this situation, the court believed, because it would erode tra-
ditional concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were 5( clearly expressed in the ~tate's statutes. ~ 
* We granted certiorari, -4- U. S. - (1984), and now H 6 7 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351./ Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
/ 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the .leg-
islature. !d., at 351. ' 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette/ . Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
82-1832-0PINION 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace _.-
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
!d., at 413. / 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely ~onnalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. / Rather, as the City of Lafayette plurality concluded, 
the municipality must establish that it acted pursuant to a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy';-"fhat was "actively supervised"-'by the State. 435 f 
U. S., at 410 . .....-The municipality need not, however, "be able 
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization"..-fn 
order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. I d., at 415. / The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
. . . to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi- J 
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market"goals." ,... !d., at 415-416. , 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980);-a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to apply J 
the entire City of Lafayette test. We held that Colorado's I 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
82-1832-0PINION 
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/ 
affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to 
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the 
~ty could not meet this requirement of the state action test, 
we declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state supervision" / 
component of the test. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. / 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover·, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. ~ We consider both of those issues below. 
. III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
~ rf'J a tory structure in some detail. 
~~ • ..,..(-- !"'l 
~ 4 ~ ,U;w.!~~..-j)f/ Wi~ Stat.~§62.!8(1~nts authority to cities to con-
/ struct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. The 
authority includes the power to "describe with reasonable 
particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid . ./ This grant 
of authority is supplemented by..,§ 66.069(2)(c),providing that 
a city operating a public utility 1\, 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
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municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
/ 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the , tate's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the De-
partment of Nat ural Resources for the connection of unincor-
porated territory to a city system shall be void if that terri-
tory refuses to become annexed to the city. 3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, the 
statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
3 There is no such order of the DepartmeJlt of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. ../ r-.:: 
• The Towns also rely on}§ 66. 076U) and )>6~0 .Q!'1li~CF-...· ..-lsco_n_s.,..in_c_o~~to 
argue that the State's policy on tlie provision of sewage services is actually 
procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not support the con-
tention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1( permits certain municipalities , 
including towns , to operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a 
general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. In addi-
tion, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the enabling statute all of 
the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit the area of service. 
Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state attitude. 
Nor does § 66.30 rud the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
\ 
t,dj~. St<tf,~YJrt./{tf,6 ll.ll\d 1 
f'::.w • J 9&1')( 
1 
1 s+ c.;te. in 
f~ti'C~~ 
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competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. . It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to en-
gage in conduct that would have anticom etitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is suffi-
cient that the statutes authorized the City to provide sewage 
services and also to determine the areas to be served. We 
think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would 
result from this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor 
Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) / 
(no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure )hat inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3,@ 54 (Supp. 1982). / · 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder,~ arguing that 
the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the 
City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-
market competition in the field of sewage services. The 
analogy to the Home Rule Amendment mvolved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it was 
neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" component 
of the state action test. The Amendment simply did not 
address the regulation of cable television. Under Home 
Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every aspect of 
policy relating to cable television, as well as policy relating to 
any other field of regulation of local concern. Here, in con-
trast, the State has specifically authorized Wisconsin cities to 
provide sewage services and has delegated to the cities the 
express authority to take action that foreseeably will result 
in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument can be 
82-183~PINION 
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made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. · 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S. , at 434-435. In j 
fact, this Court has never reqt8ed the degre·e of specificity I r / 
that the Towns insist is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legi~lature contemplated the 
~L. .... • I kind of action complained of.' ''-::/City of Lafayette, supra, at 
41.5 (quoting the ([eicis@ of the / ourt of ,ippeals, 532 F. 2d 
5 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
'Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under- I 
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of immu-
nizing state action fromJ:.erai antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. ttr/ 
Turner, Antitrust La~O).n2.3(b) (Supp. 1982). / "1t"" 
1' ---
1~ II t -r 
,..., lf\~ 1 
A- 'J i\4 .h.~­
~ff r< t f"~h4 
~I 
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)).7 / This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on langu~e in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). / we disagree with this contention for 
several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private 
parties-not municipalities-daiming the state)lction exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a munici-
pality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the 
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be 
presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf. 
7 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City ofChiwewaFalls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982)( m which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat- lfL 
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The ,tate rfupreme ~ourt dis- s ( ~ I rs · 
agreed, concludin that the le 'slature intended the City to undertake the j 
c a enged actions. Those actions t erefore exempt from the I 
~ / ~tate's antitrust laws. Analy/ mg §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court z 
- concluded that the legislature had ''viewed annexation by the city of a sur-~~ 
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid I2!:Q. quo that a city could '-J.. f al -1 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541 / 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. / 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
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None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul- / 
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, ~455 U.S., at lj 
56-57,-'ind City of Lafayette,~435 U.S., at 416-417, / /$/ 
spoke in tenns of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated state policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an 
evidentiary matter to prove that the challenged practice con-
stitutes state action. In short, although compulsion affirma-
tively expressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is 
by no means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality 
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy . 
• 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
say, without elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410 . ..,., In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980){ a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor · is a 
municipality. 
As with res;ect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above,<iee aftiia. at 9 Wthe requirement of active state\ 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is 
one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the chal-
lenged conduct pursuant to state policy. In Midcal, we 
~I 
82-1832---0PINION 
HALLIE v. EA U CLAIRE 11 
stated that the active state supervision requirement was nec-
essary to prevent a State from circumventing the Sherman 
Act's proscriptions "by casting~ gauzy cloak of state~( 
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." / 445 U. S., at 106. / Where a private party is 
engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real dan-
ger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than 
the governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is I 
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved 
in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger 
is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests 
at the expense of more overriding state goals. This danger 
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the 
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 
Once it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no 
need to require the State to supervise actively the municipal-
ity's execution of what is a properly delegated function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
8 In addition to being unnecessary, .requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other 
;tates, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of 
Hallie v. City ofChiwewaFalls, supra, at 539;'~14 N. W. 2d, at 324.4 To 
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and 
possibly limit the State's ability to focus on more general matters of state-
wide concern. 
~ >t-.cla.... s ~.--vr:.~-G ,-_.) 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1832 
TOWN OF HALLIE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[~ -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the.State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns}-are four Wis-
consin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respond-
ent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is lo-
cated in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against 
the City in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that 
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by 
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment 
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying 
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage 
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the 
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treat-
ment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that in-
cluded the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market 
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sew-
age treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the 
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a 
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum 
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. 
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's 
sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a util-
ity to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not 
at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Broum, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wis-
consin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage serv-
ices and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated 
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State ha.9...£9n-
templated that anticompetitive effects might result)~ Xhe 
City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to state authoriZation 
within the meaning of Parker v. Broum, supra. The court 
also concluded that in a case such as this involving "a local 
government performing a traditional municipal function," 700 
F . 2d, at 384, active state supervision was unnecessary for 
Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such supervision as a 
prerequisite to immunity would also be unwise in this situa-
tion, the court believed, because it would erode traditional 
concepts of local autonomy and home rule that were clearly 
expressed in the State's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Broum. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. I d., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
82-1832-0PINION 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state · cy to displace 
competition with regulation or mono y public service." 
Id., at 413. 
The determination that a m cipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a p y formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a Icipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declarin · to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. - 1 
th It acted pursuant to a 
"clearly a · ulated an a 1ve y expressed ... state pol-
icy" that as " ctivel su ervised" b the State. 435 U. S. 
at 410. e municipality need not e a le to 
n o a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in order 
to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust suit. 
Id., at 415. The plurality viewed this approach as desirable 
because it' preserv[ed] to the States their freedom ... to ad-
minister state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the 
federal antitrust laws without at the same time permitting 
purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market 
goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 3 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party.J:ln:--\r 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to a.di~~=:JC.: 
~ae eH~~ City of Lafayette We held that Coloraoo's 
Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, conferring on 
municipal governments general authority to govern local 
U.S~1"" ID~ . 
• t • \ ...... ~c.h· (1'1\ 04-a.-W~ ~ 
~ M-itlcpj wos ~ ~l "-~ a. \I'V\o..~~ c;t.; i ~e.. ~r ~ ~ e,uud lw 
·r. · ~ Df A tc. ~tic awt. ~ toV~- ivof. I t "e G L;..._, - ~~ 
"' It e, .1'' ~ ~~~ 4"f rtuitw~ 1~ M6~"""'~ ·~w J ~1;t~~~- ~,;; :VM ~ r 
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affairs, did not constitute a "clear articulation" of a state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct with respect to 
the regulation of cable television in the locale. Because the 
city could not meet this requirement of the state action test, 
we declined to decid~ whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satis~ ike "aetive sfie Sl:if>el'VisieB'b 
'19Rlf>6Bel'lt ef Ute te~ 455 U. S., at 51-5 , n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
· activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities 
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with reason-
able particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This 
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a 
public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
6 
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area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order by the 
Department of Natural Resources for the connection of un-
incorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that 
territory refuses to become annexed to the city { ~ 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct~ As discussed above, the ~ 
®--7 There is no such order of the Department of Nat ural Resources at 
· ue in this case. 
The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965 
Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage 
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside 
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain 
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provi-
sion is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-
scription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the en-
abling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit 
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive 
state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to 
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
~~g the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389 
\....V {ll:J'i~~t is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to 
proviae sewage services and also to determine the areas to be 
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logi-
cally would result from this broad authority to regulate. See 
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, 
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently 
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. 
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 212.3, p. 54 (Supp. 
1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the 
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City 
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market 
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to 
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is in-
apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution al-
located only the most general authority to municipalities to 
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not 
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action 
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation 
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was 
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable 
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regu-
lation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has spe-
cifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage serv-
ices and has delegated to the cities the express authority to 
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take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive ef-
fects. No reasonable argument can be made that these stat-
utes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule 
Amendment was." o/ 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
ta e · . Justice Stewart's dissent in City of 
Lafayet e was concerned that the plurality's opinion would 
impose this kind of requirement on legislatures, with detri-
mental side effects upon municipalities' local autonomy and 
authority to govern themselves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In 
fact, this Court has never required the degree of specificity 
that the Towns insist is necessaryJ ~ 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that " 'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d 
@-~Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
~Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
~ dftermine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under-
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of im-
munizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & 
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
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431, 434 (CA5 1976)).k This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 'V 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a 
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, ab-
~ent a showin to the contrary, that the municipality acts in 
\ ... ~ .. r the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may 
be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf. 
@-Jour view of the le!Oslature's intent is supportod by Town of Halli• v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533,314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's 
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court con-
cluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question ·of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
. . . L..L 'f'o(I.CirL l~l4 L., h, be. e"posed +c 
o1 tl.t ..\-1:. 1 ".. • .., ~wc4feJ. co""'elt•t...+- ~~ ,nuav•o.--1 ~ u..h'.fc.:l +" ~limo~~ 'r .y~.,s.~"'{e. '-O'Y'-A.~·d. !Ylu.u~r~t..:he!. ·~ ::,CM.Q.. ~~ ~ ~"~s: ~~lQ... 
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None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57, 
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms 
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompet-
itive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is 
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary 
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state 
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively ex-
pressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plut{litl gpinion in City of Lafayette did 
\---!S:ill,,., without elaboratio that a city claiming the exemption 
must show that its anticompetitive conduct was actively 
supervised by the State. 435 U. S., at 410. In California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that supervision is 
required where the anticompetitive conduct is by private par-
ties. In City of Boulder, however, the most recent relevant '~S ~.S,,o.t ~1·5-. 'fl •. ~ 
case, we expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. '"l~ 
We now conclude that the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a 
municipality.~ 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves 
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring 
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant 
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state 
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supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State 
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by 
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., 
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anti-
competitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to 
further his own interests, rather than the governmental in-
terests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, 
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private 
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it 
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the 
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is mini-
mal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal-
ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it 
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to 
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's ex-
ecution of what is a properly delegated function.~ 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
In addition to being unnecessary, requiring States actively to super-
vise municipal conduct would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other 
States, has a tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities to 
regulate a wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town of 
Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, supra, at 539, 314 N. W. 2d, at 324. To 
require active supervision by the State would erode local autonomy and 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wis-
consin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respond-
ent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is lo-
cated in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against 
the City in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that 
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by 
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment 
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying 
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage 
1 The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
--
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the 
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treat-
ment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that in-
cluded the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market 
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sew-
age treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the 
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a 
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum 
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. 
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's 
sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The Di~trict Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a util-
ity to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not 
at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wis-
consin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage serv-
ices and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated 
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had con-
templated that anticompetitive effects might result, and con-
cluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to 
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, 
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this 
involving "a local government performing a traditional 
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervi-
sion was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Re-
quiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would 
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home 
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. Id., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
Id., at 413. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to 
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" 
____ in-:-:-or_d_~-::r:-lto_ assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
J-1.85 {[.5 . , suit. ~ at 415. Rather, the jpinie'ft suggested, without 
deciding the issue, that it would be sufficient to obtain 
Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it acted pur-
suant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
. .. state policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State. 
486lJ. ti.., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party.3 In 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
3 Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an in-
junction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or 
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine 
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was 
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from 
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anti-
competitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States,- U.S.-,- (1985). 
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wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to ac-
cept City of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must 
show more tha~~t state policy to displace competition exists. 
We held that Co orado's Home Rule Amendment to its Con-
stitution, conferring on municipal governments general au-
thority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear ar-
ticulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive 
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in 
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement 
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether gov-
ernmental action by a municipality must also be actively su-
pervised by the State. 455 U. 8., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
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A 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities 
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with reason-
able particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This 
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a 
public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the 
Department of Nat ural Resources for the connection of un-
incorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that 
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the 
'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
5 The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965 
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage 
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside 
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain 
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provi-
sion is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to 
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389 
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to 
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be 
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logi-
cally would result from this broad authority to regulate. See 
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, 
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently 
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. 
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp. 
1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of B,oulder, arguing that the 
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City 
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market 
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to 
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is in-
scription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the en-
abling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit 
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive 
state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution al-
located only the most general authority to municipalities to 
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not 
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action 
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation 
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was 
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable 
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regu-
lation of local concern. Here, in contrast, .the State has spe-
cifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage serv-
ices and has delegated to the cities the express authority to 
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive ef-
fects. No reasonable argument can be made that these stat-
utes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule 
Amendment was. 6 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences. 
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned 
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of require-
ment on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern them-
selves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never 
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is 
necessary. 7 
6 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
7 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)).8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under-
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of im-
munizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & 
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
8 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's 
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court con-
cluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
82-1832-0PINION 
10 HALLIE v. EAU CLAIRE 
U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion.;,e2 This fact distinguishes those cases because a ~ 
m_(ni~~ty is an arm of the State. We may presume, ab-
sent a snowing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in 
the public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand, 
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own 
behalf. 
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57, 
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms 
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompet-
itive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is 
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary 
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state 
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively ex-
pressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
9 Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be 
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some .-
states are subjel o "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regula- r ' 
tions, and munic1 al officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some ,... ~ degree through e electoral process. Such a position in the public eye 
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists 
for private parties. 
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suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue, 
that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anti-
competitive conduct was actively supervised by the State. 
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a 
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the 
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of 
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we ex-
___ ....-;r...;:;e.-ss;;.;;l~left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S., 
,. -"'" at 51-52 n. 14. We now conclude that the active state super-
~ ) 
vision r quirement should not be imposed in cases in which 
the actor is a municipality. 10 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves 
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring 
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant 
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state 
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State 
· from circumventing the Sherman · Act's proscriptions "by 
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., 
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anti-
competitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to 
further his own interests, rather than the governmental in-
terests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, 
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private 
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it 
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the 
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is mini-
mal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal-
10 In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active 
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here de-
cide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is 
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a 
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., at-. 
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ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it 
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to 
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's ex-
ecution of what is a properly delegated function. 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wis-
consin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respond-
ent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is lo-
cated in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against 
the City in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that 
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by 
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment 
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying 
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage 
'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the 
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treat-
ment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that in-
cluded the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market 
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sew-
age treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the 
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a 
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum 
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. 
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's 
sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a util-
ity to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not 
at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wis-
consin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage serv-
ices and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated 
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had con-
templated that anticompetitive effects might result, and con- ' 
eluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to 
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, 
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this 
involving "a local government performing a traditional 
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervi-
sion was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Re-
quiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would 
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home 
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. !d., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
Jf35 {l .S. > 
;II!.' 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
Id., at 413. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to 
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" 
in order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. ~' at 415. Rather, suggested, without 
deciding the issue, that it wou be sufficient to obtain 
Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it acted pur-
suant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
. . . state policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State. 
iaijp. 8., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach as de-
sirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their freedom 
... to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhi-
bitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time 
permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's 
free-market goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. 3 In I 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
s Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an in-
junction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or 
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine 
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was 
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from 
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anti-
competitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States, - U. S. -, - (1985). 
, 
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wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to ac- ~ 
ce t Cit of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must 
s ow more tha a state policy to displace competition exists. 
We held that Co orado's Home Rule Amendment to its Con-
stitution, conferring on municipal governments general au-
thority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear ar-
ticulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive 
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in 
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement 
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether gov-
ernmental action by a municipality must also be actively su- } 
pervised by the State. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
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A 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities 
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with reason-
able particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This 
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a 
public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the 
Department of Nat ural Resources for the connection of un-
incorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that 
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4 I 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the 
'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
\ 
5 The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965 
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage 
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside 
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain 
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provi-
sion is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to" refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to 
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389 
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to J 
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be 
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logi-
cally would result from this broad authority to regulate. See 
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, 
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently 
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. 
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp. 
1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the 
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City 
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market 
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to 
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is in-
scription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the en-
abling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit 
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive 
state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution al-
located only the most general authority to municipalities to 
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not 
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action 
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation 
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was 
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable 
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regu-
lation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has spe-
cifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage serv-
ices and has delegated to the cities the express authority to 
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive ef-
fects. No reasonable argument can be made that these stat-
utes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule f 
Amendment was. 6 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences. I· 
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned 
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of require-
ment on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern them-
selves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never 
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is 
necessary. 7 I 
I 6 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
I 7 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of.'" City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear I 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under-
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of im-
munizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & 
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, ~ 212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
f 8 0ur view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's 
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court con-
cluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." !d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a 
municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, ab-
sent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in 
the public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand, J 
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own 
behalf. 
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57, 
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms 
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompet-
itive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is 
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary 
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state 
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively ex-
pressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
9 Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be 
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some 
states are subject.!o "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regula- ~ 
tions, and munictA>al officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some J; 
degree through the electoral process. Such a position in the public eye 
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists 
for private parties. 
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suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue, t 
that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anti-
competitive conduct was actively supervised by the State. 
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a 
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the 
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of 
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we ex-
ressl left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S., I 
at 51-5 n. 14. We now conclude that the active state super-
vision r quirement should not be imposed in cases in which I 
the actor is a municipality. 10 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves 
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring 
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant 
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state 
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State 
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by 
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., 
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anti-
competitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to 
further his own interests, rather than the governmental in-
terests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, 
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private 
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it 
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the 
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is mini-
mal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal-
10 In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active 
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here de-
cide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is 
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a 
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., at-. 
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ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it 
is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to 
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's ex-
ecution of what is a properly delegated function. J 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
/ 
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This case presents the question whether a municipality's 
anticompetitive activities are protected by the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws established by Parker 
v. Broum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), when the activities are au-
thorized, but not compelled, by the State, and the State does 
not actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners-Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the Towns)-are four Wis-
consin unincorporated townships located adjacent to respond-
ent, the City of Eau Claire (the City). Town of Hallie is lo-
cated in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit against 
the City in United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief and alleging that 
the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., by 
acquiring a monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment 
services in Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties, and by tying 
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage 
'The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa Counties. 
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collection and transportation services. 2 Under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the 
City had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage treat-
ment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, that in-
cluded the Towns; the facility is the only one in the market 
available to the Towns. The City has refused to supply sew-
age treatment services to the Towns. It does supply the 
services to individual landowners in areas of the Towns if a 
majority of the individuals in the area vote by referendum 
election to have their homes annexed by the City, see Wis. 
Stat. §§ 66.024(4), 144.07(1) (1982), and to use the City's 
sewage collection and transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the City in 
the collection and transportation of sewage, the Towns con-
tended in the District Court that the City used its monopoly 
over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful monopoly over 
the provision of sewage collection and transportation serv-
ices, in violation of the Sherman Act. They also contended 
that the City's actions constituted an illegal tying arrange-
ment and an unlawful refusal to deal with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that Wis-
consin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of sew-
age service expressed a clear state policy to replace compe-
tition with regulation. The court also found that the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through the 
State's Department of Natural Resources, that was author-
ized to review municipal decisions concerning provision of 
sewage services and corresponding annexations of land. 
The court concluded that the City's allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct fell within the state action exemption to the federal 
antitrust laws, as set forth in Community Communications 
2 The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and of a common-law duty of a util-
ity to serve. The District Court dismissed these claims, and they are not 
at issue in this Court. 
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Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), and Parker v. 
Brown, supra. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed. 700 F. 2d 376 (1983). It ruled that the Wis-
consin statutes authorized the City to provide sewage serv-
ices and to refuse to provide such services to unincorporated 
areas. The court therefore assumed that the State had con-
templated that anticompetitive effects might result, and con- I 
eluded that the City's conduct was thus taken pursuant to 
state authorization within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, 
supra. The court also concluded that in a case such as this 
involving "a local government performing a traditional 
municipal function," 700 F. 2d, at 384, active state supervi-
sion was unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Re-
quiring such supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would 
also be unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and home 
rule that were clearly expressed in the State's statutes. 
We granted certiorari, 467 U. S. -- (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state action 
doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, re-
lying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the 
Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legisla-
ture. 317 U. S., at 350-351. Rather, it ruled that the Sher-
man Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade, 
and it refused to infer an intent to "nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents" in activities directed by the leg-
islature. I d., at 351. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, are not beyond the reach 
of the antitrust laws by virtue of their status because they 
are not themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, municipalities 
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must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were 
authorized by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
Id., at 413. 
The determination that a municipality's activities consti-
tute state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State 
may not validate a municipality's anticompetitive conduct 
simply by declaring it to be lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, 
at 351. On the other hand, in proving that a state policy to 
displace competition exists, the municipality need not "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" 
in order to assert a successful Parker defense to an antitrust 
suit. 435 U. S., at 415. Rather, City of Lafayette sug-
gested, without deciding the issue, that it would be sufficient 
to obtain Parker immunity for a municipality to show that it 
acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed ... state policy" that was "actively supervised" by 
the State. Id., at 410. The plurality viewed this approach 
as desirable because it "preserv[ed] to the States their free-
dom ... to administer state regulatory policies free of the in-
hibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same 
time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the N a-
tion's free-market goals." I d., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court applied 
the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case in which the 
state action exemption was claimed by a private party. 3 In I 
that case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's 
3 Midcal was originally brought as a mandamus action seeking an in-
junction against a state agency, the California Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control. The state played no role, however, in setting prices or 
reviewing their reasonableness, activities carried out by the private wine 
dealers. 445 U. S., at 100-101. The mere fact that the state agency was 
a named defendant was not sufficient to alter the state action analysis from 
that appropriate to a case involving the state regulation of private anti-
competitive acts. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. 
United States, - U. S. -, - (1985). 
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wine pricing system. Even though there was a clear legisla-
tive policy to permit resale liquor price maintenance, there 
was no state supervision of the anticompetitive activity. 
Thus, the private wine producers who set resale prices were 
not entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to ac- ~ 
cept City of Lafayette's suggestion that a municipality must 
show more than that a state policy to displace competition ex-
ists. We held that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment to its 
Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general 
authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear 
articulation" of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive 
conduct with respect to the regulation of cable television in 
the locale. Because the city could not meet this requirement 
of the state action test, we declined to decide whether gov-
ernmental action by a municipality must also be actively su- ~ 
pervised by the State. 455 U. S., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a municipal-
ity will be entitled to the protection of the state action ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is 
engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly ex-
pressed state policy. We have never fully considered, how-
ever, how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a 
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. Moreover, we have ex-
pressly left open the question whether action by a municipal-
ity-like action by a private party-must satisfy the "active 
state supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 
51-52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code to 
support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive activity 
constitutes state action. We therefore examine the statu-
tory structure in some detail. 
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A 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.18(1) (1982) grants authority to cities 
to construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with reason-
able particularity the district to be [served]." Ibid. This 
grant of authority is supplemented by Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 66.069(2)(c) (Supp. 1984), providing that a city operating a 
public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unin-
corporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the 
area within which service will be provided and the 
municipal utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond 
the area so delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, § 144.07(1) provides 
that the State's Department of Natural Resources may re-
quire a city's sewerage system to be constructed so that 
other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the system, and 
the Department may order that such connections be made. 
Subsection (1m) provides, however, that an order by the 
Department of Natural Resources for the connection of un-
incorporated territory to a city system shall be void if that 
territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 4 I 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do not 
evidence a state policy to displace competition in the provi-
sion of sewage services because they make no express men-
tion of anticompetitive conduct. 5 As discussed above, the f 
J 'There is no such order of the Department of Natural Resources at 
issue in this case. 
J 6 The Towns also rely on Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 66.076(1) and 66.30 (1965 
and Supp. 1984) to argue that the State's policy on the provision of sewage 
services is actually procompetitive. This claim must fail because, aside 
from the fact that it was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
support the contention. First, it is true that § 66.076(1) permits certain 
municipalities, including towns, to operate sewage systems. The provi-
sion is simply a general enabling statute, however, not a mandatory pre-
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statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anti-
competitive conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable result of 
empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed areas. It 
is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the state legisla-
ture to have stated explicitly that it expected the City to 
engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. 
Applying the analysis of City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. 389 
(1978), it is sufficient that the statutes authorized the City to I 
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be 
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logi-
cally would result from this broad authority to regulate. See 
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 
109 (1978) (no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, 
but statute provided regulatory structure that inherently 
"displace[d] unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. 
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, p. 54 (Supp. 
1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the stat-
utes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The Towns 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home Rule 
Amendment involved in City of Boulder, arguing that the 
Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave the City 
free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or free-market 
competition in the field of sewage services. The analogy to 
the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder is in-
scription. In addition, subsection (8) of§ 66.076 incorporates into the en-
abling statute all of the limitations of§ 66.069, including the power to limit 
the area of service. Thus, § 66.076(1) does not express a procomp'etitive 
state attitude. 
Nor does§ 66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general provision concerning all 
utilities-not just sewerage systems-that permits municipalities to enter 
into cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but merely 
permissive. Moreover, even assuming two municipalities agreed pursu-
ant to this section to cooperate in providing sewage services, the result 
would not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two combined 
might well be more effective than either alone in keeping other municipal-
ities out of the market. 
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apposite. That Amendment to the Colorado Constitution al-
located only the most general authority to municipalities to 
govern local affairs. We held that it was neutral and did not 
satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action 
test. The Amendment simply did not address the regulation 
of cable television. Under Home Rule the municipality was 
to be free to decide every aspect of policy relating to cable 
television, as well as policy relating to any other field of regu-
lation of local concern. Here, in contrast, the State has spe-
cifically authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage serv-
ices and has delegated to the cities the express authority to 
take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive ef-
fects. No reasonable argument can be made that these stat-
utes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home Rule 
Amendment was. 6 I 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to pass 
the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must expressly 
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for 
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects. This 
contention embodies an unrealistic view of how legislatures 
work and of how statutes are written. No legislature can be 
expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by the 
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences. 1 
Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned 
that the plurality's opinion would impose this kind of require-
ment on legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern them-
selves. 435 U. S., at 434-435. In fact, this Court has never 
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist is 
necessary. 7 I 
f 8 Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes leave to the City the 
discretion whether to provide sewage services. States must always be 
free to delegate such authority to their political subdivisions. 
I 7 Requiring such a close examination of a state legislature's intent to 
determine whether the federal antitrust laws apply would be undesirable 
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In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
to displace competition with regulation in the area of munici-
pal provision of sewerage services. These statutory provi-
sions plainly show that "'the legislature contemplated the 
kind of action complained of."' City of Lafayette, supra, at 
415 (quoting the decison of the Court of Appeals, 532 F. 2d 
431, 434 (CA5 1976)). 8 This is sufficient to satisfy the clear I 
articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" re-
quirement of the state action test requires at least that the 
City show that the State "compelled" it to act. In so doing, 
they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
also because it would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary inter-
pretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the courts, it would under-
cut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action doctrine of im-
munizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & 
D. Turner, Antitrust Law, U12.3(b) (Supp. 1982). l 8 Our view of the legislature's intent is supported by Town of Hallie v. 
City ofChippe:wa Falls, 105 WiB. 2d 533, 314 N. W. 2d 321 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge 
under state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in a case 
quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town of Hallie argued that the 
City's refusal to provide it with sewage treatment services, the require-
ment of annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision of treat-
ment services on the acceptance also of sewage collection and other city 
services, violated the state antitrust laws. The State Supreme Court dis-
agreed, concluding that the legislature intended the City to undertake the 
challenged actions. Those actions therefore were exempt from the State's 
antitrust laws. Analyzing §§ 66.069(2)(c) and 144.07(1m), the court con-
cluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a sur-
rounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could 
require before extending sewer services to the area." I d., at 540-541, 314 
N. W. 2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does not, of course, de-
cide the question presented here of the City's immunity under the federal 
antitrust laws, it is instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal provision of sewer-
age services. 
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U. S. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S. 773 (1975). We disagree with this contention for sev-
eral reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb concerned private par-
ties-not municipalities-claiming the state action exemp-
tion. This fact distinguishes those cases because a munici-
pality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a 
showing 'to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the 
public interest. 9 A private party, on the other hand, may be 
presumed to be acting primarily .on his or its own behalf. 
None of our cases involving the application of the state ac-
tion exemption to a municipality has required that compul-
sion be shown. Both City of Boulder, 455 U. S., at 56-57, 
and City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416-417, spoke in terms 
of the State's direction or authorization of the anticompet-
itive practice at issue. This is so because where the actor is 
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy, compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary 
matter to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state 
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively ex-
pressed may be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality acted 
pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active state 
supervision, the City may not depend on the state action ex-
emption. The Towns rely primarily on language in City of 
Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have not been 
entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did 
suggest, without elaboration and without deciding the issue, 
9 Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more likely to be 
exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct. Municipalities in some 
states are subject to "sunshine" laws or other mandatory disclosure regula-
tions, and municipal officers, unlike corporate heads, are checked to some 
degree through the electoral process. Such a position in the public eye 
may provide some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists 
for private parties. 
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that a city claiming the exemption must show that its anti-
competitive conduct was actively supervised by the State. 
435 U. S., at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), a 
unanimous Court held that supervision is required where the 
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of 
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we ex-
pressly left this issue open as to municipalities. 455 U. S., I 
at 51-52, n. 14. We now conclude that the active state su-
pervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in 
which the actor is a municipality. 10 I 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, the requirement of active state supervision serves 
essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring 
that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant 
to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active state 
supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a State 
from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by 
casting ... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U. S., 
at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the anti-
competitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to 
further his own interests, rather than the governmental in-
terests of the State. Where the actor is a municipality, 
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private 
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it 
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the 
expense of more overriding state goals. This danger is mini-
mal, however, because of the requirement that the municipal-
ity act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it 
10 In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active 
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here de-
cide that issue. Where state or municipal regulation of a private party is 
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a 
clearly articulated state policy exists. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra,- U. S., at-. 
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is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to 
require the State to supervise actively the municipality's ex-
ecution of what is a properly delegated function. 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire in 
this case are exempt from the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to replace 
competition in the provision of sewerage services with regu-
lation. We further hold that active state supervision is not a 
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the 
actor is a municipality rather than a private party. We 
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
lgs December 17, 1984 
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This case presents the question whether a 
municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by 
2. 
the state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws 
established by Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943), when 
the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the 
State, and the State does not actively supervise the 
anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners--Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of washington (the "Towns")--are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the 
City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is 
located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit 
against the City in United States District Court for the 
1The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa 
Counties. 
3. 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief 
and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the 
provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and 
Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such 
services to the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation . 2 services. Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§1151, et seq., the City 
had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage 
treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, 
~ 
included the Towns: the facility is the only one in 
the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
2The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S. C. §§1151, et seq. , 
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve. The 
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at 
issue in this Court. 
4. 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns4~r: 
~ :h t ~es the services to individual landowners 
~ f7 
in the Towns if the individuals agree also to be annexed , 
by the City and to use the City's sewage collection and 
transportation services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the 
and transportation of sewage, the 
Towns contended in the district court that the City used 
--
its monopoly over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful 
monopoly over the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. 
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an 
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal 
with the Towns. 
~-P'~ 
9 ~-
~· -, ,/ 
~\~ 
5. 
The district court ruled for the City. It found that 
Wisconsin's 
~
s~~~t~nu~~o~r~~ ~s~c~b~eme regulating 
-1 
the municipal 
provision of sewage service expressed a clear state policy 
to replace competition with regulation~Athat the State 
adequately supervised the municipality's conduct through ;;vt r1 }' 
~othe state 
~~ authorized 
Department of Natural Resources, ~was 
municipal decisions concerning to review 
~~ provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations 
~ f ,, r/' '' of land . Cnnseque<>tl"" -,;.;:;, 






court concluded that the 
City's allegedly anticompetitive conduct fell within the 
state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as 
set forth in Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, 455 u.s. 40 {1982), and Parker v. Brown, supra-g 
~~t dismissed the complaint. 
6. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed. 700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that 
~ 




d t~he ~a of sewage services and to refuse to provide such 
services to unincorporated areas •. II'=i~=tt::;# 
~ourtA~ ~tate had contemplated that 
anticompetitive effects might result. The City's conduct 
thus constituted state action within the meaning of Parker 
v. Brown, supra. The court also concluded that in a case 
such as this involving "a local government performing a 
traditional municipal function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active 
state supervision was unnecessary for Parker immunity to 
apply • 7 T;e local government was exercising 1\ 1\ 
delegated authority pursuant to a clearly articulated 
state policy. Requiring such supervision as a 
7. 
prerequisite to irnrnuni ty would also be unwise in this 
situation, the court believed, because it would erode 
traditional concepts of local autonomy and horne rule that 
l 
were clearly expressed in the state's statutes. 









(1984) , [104 s.ct., at __ ], the "starting point in 
analysis involving the state action doctrine is 
~,t-~ . f p k reason1ng o ar er v. 
a-~~~-~'-' 
 principles of federalism 
Brown." In Parker, relying on 
and state sovereignty, the Court 
- et-1- 1/U.A__. 
~ refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the 
~~~ ~-~-
~~ ~ anticornpetitive aetiQQs of a State acting through its 
~~ 





the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private 
restraints on trade, and it refused to infer an intent to 
"nullify a state's control over its officers and agents" 
in activities directed by the legislature. 
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on 
the other hand, are not ~t~e ~Hol~sion f£9ffi the 
'\ 
reach of the anti trust laws by virtue of . their statu~ 
because they are not themselves sovereign. City of 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 
412 7 political 
subdivisions must demonstrate that their anticompetitive 
(1978). Rather, to obtain exemption, 
activities were directed by the State "pursuant to state 
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly 
public service." Id. , at 413 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) • 
Thus, a showing by the municipality that its 
9. 
anticompetitive activities constitute state action 
entitles it to exemption from Sherman Act liability. 
To determine that a municipality's activities 
constitute state action is not a purely formalistic 
inquiry; the State may not validate a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be 
lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351. Rather, the City 
of Lafayette plurality concluded that the municipality 
.vz_j..~ 
mu , resent evidenc~ that it acted pursuant to a "clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
4d-
policy" wMen was "actively supervised" by the State, 435 
u.s. , at 410 (opinion of BRENNAN, 
\ 
J.) • the 
municipality need not "be able to pbint to a specific, 
detailed legislative authorization" in order to assert a 
successful Parker defense to an antitrust suit. Id., at 
10. 
415 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). The plurality viewed this 
approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed) to the 
States their freedom to administer state regulatory 
policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust 
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial 
interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market goals." 
Id., at 415-416 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous 
Court applied the ~l':!'!'~~ed test to a case 
" 
in which the State's agent was ·a private party. In that 
case, we found no antitrust immunity for California's wine 
pricing system even though there was a clear legislative 
,/ 




was no state 
"\ 
supervision of the anticompetitive 
11. 
activity. issue of a When we ;:z: again addressed the 
municipality's exemption from the antitrust laws in City 
of Boulder, supra, however, we declined to apply fully the 
City of Lafayette plurality's two-pronged test. We ~ 
that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment to its 
Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general 
authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a 
"clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize 
anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of 
cable television in the locale. Because the city could 
not pass the 
action test, 
"clear articulation" --yt.<_~ state 
'\ 
~
we exprees-ly r9fueed 
1 
to decide whether 
governmental action by a municipality must also satisfy 
the "active state supervision" 
~
 of the test. Id. , at 
1\ 
51-52, n. 14. 
12. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a 
municipality will be entitled to the protection of the 
state action exemption to the anti trust laws, it must 
demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity 
(;L,~~~)~~ 
pursuant to s.t.a t e... d i ~;.ect i:;sn . We have never fully 
1\ 
addressed, however, how clearly a state policy must be 
articulated for a municipality to be able to say that its 
~} 
anticompetitive activity constitutes state action, ~ we ...., 
have expressly left open the question of whether action by 
a municipality--like action by a private party--must 
satisfy the .. active state supervision .. requirement. City 
~
of Boulder, supra, at 51-52, n. 14. We address both of 
those issues below. 
III 
13. 
of the Wisconsin Code to support its claim that its 
allegedly anticompetitive activity constitutes state 
action. 
the statutory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to 
construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with 
reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." 
This grant of authority is supplemented by §66.069(2) (c), 
~ 
~h provides that a city operating a public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service 
in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall 
delineate the area within which service will be 
provided and the municipal utility shall have no 
obligation to serve beyond the area so 
delineated." 
14. 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, §144.07(1) 
provides that the State Department of Natural Resources 
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so 
that other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the 
system, and the Department may order that such connections 
be made. Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order 
by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection 
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void 
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 
The Court of Appeals ruled, and we agree, that these 
statutory provisions evidence a "clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed" state policy to displace 
competition with regulation in the area of municipal 
provision of sewerage services. The statutes expressly 
authorize the City to construct a sewerage system and to 
15. 
provide sewage services; it also permits the City to Hr 
A 
the area within which to extend such services and imposes 
no obligation on the City to serve beyond that area. 
These statutory provisions plainly show that "the 
legislature contemplated the kind of action complained 
of," City of Lafayette, supra, at 415 ,§ pinion of BRENNAN, -4 
~-i!J~he necessary consequence of this statutory structur 
is that the City is empowered both to provide sewerag 
services and to refuse to deal with parties who do 
comply with its conditions. 3 
3our view of the legislature's intent is supported by 
Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533, 
314 N.W.2d 321 (1982), in which the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge under 
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in 
a case quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town 
of Hallie argued that the City's refusal to provide it 
with sewage treatment services, the requirement of 
annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision 
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage 
collection and other city services, violated the state 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do 
not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the 
provision of sewage services because they make no express 
mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 ~ 
antitrust laws. The state supreme cou5
1
1-disagr ~ 
concluding that the legislature intended the City'~ to 
under take the challenged actions, wb i~l:l WG~alo therefo/e~ be 
d~~m~g to be exempt from the state's ant1trust laws. 
Analysing §§66.069(2) (c) and 144.07(lm), the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by 
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a 
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before 
extending sewer services to the area." Id., at 540-541, 
314 N.W.2d 325. ---
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does 
not, of course, decide the question presented here of the 
City's immunity under the federal anti trust laws, it is 
instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal 
provision of sewerage services. 
4The Towns also rely on §§66. 076 (1) and 66.30 of the 
Wisconsin code to argue that the State's policy on the 
provision of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve. 
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the prov~sions relied upon do not 
support the contentio~. F~r ft t is true that §66.076(1) 
permits enumerated municipalities, including towns, to 
operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general 
enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
17. 
As discussed above, the statutes 
e..- a_ 
contemplat1all ~ t.~tt!ate that tae City 
anticompetitive conduct. conduct is a 
foreseeable result of empowering the City to refuse to 
serve unannexed areas. It is not necessary, as the Towns 
.f0c-}1h~~ 
contend, for the State legislature to have stated in sE> 
---{ 
O many words that it expected the City to engage in conduct 
that would have anticompetitive effects. Applying the 
In addition, subsection ( 8) of §66. 076 incorporates into 
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66. 069, 
including the power to limit the area of service. Thus, 
§66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state 
attitude.j~ ):' d) 9.).. 
Nor .H5 §66. 30 of ·~ gJ;eatQr aid ~ the Towns. .Jil.A-at d seotion is a general provis!P~~ concerning all utilities--
not just sewerage systems, ~h permits municipalities to 
enter into cooperative agreements. The statute is not 
mandatory, but merely permissive. Moreover, even assuming 
two municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to 
cooperate in providing sewage services, the result would 
not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two 
combined might well be more ~ul than either alone in 





d.L-~~~1-o -6-e,~ ~ lJ-e. 
~ t.-1- 1/V c.h.4..;- Hr-t.l-
analysis of City of Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient 
that the statutes s8m1 the-- Seate- iRte-si3ea- the Gity-- to--..y-
~ ~~_._, __ J 




1\. regula \refl· See New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin w. Fox 
Co., 439 u.s. 96, 109 (1978) (no express intent to 
displace the antitrust laws, but statute provided 
regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d) 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the 
statutes at issue here are neutral on State policy. The 
~ J..t.-t J; 
attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home 
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing 
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave 
19. 
the City free to pursue either anticornpetitive conduct or 
free-market cornpeti tion in the field of sewage services. 
The analogy to the Horne Rule Amendment involved in City of 
~~ ~ Boulder is inapposite,( hev That Amendment 




~· ~ Y.~.it I authority to rnunicipali ties to govern local affairs. We 
··~~ 
pv~~ 
Cj ~ld that it was neutral an~ con!le~uec..tll)_ did not 
()/ r )-1> ~ satisfy the "clear articulation" ~state action 
~~tv ~- 7/u..~~ 
~test, b~•sat>se~11 did not i"' aA~a•pact address the 
~q ~ regulation of cable televis~n~ Under ~ 




of policy relating to cable television, as well as policy 
relating to any other field of regulation of local 
concern. Here, in co~ast, the State has ~ 
~~1-f,~ 
specifically J\ ir> He sla~ aboul;-- th& £e9"lalion uy-




express authority to take action that foreseeably will 
result in anticompetitive effects. No reasonable argument 
can be made that these statutes are neutral in the same 
way that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. 
Nor does it help the Towns • claim that the statutes 
leave to the City the discretion whether to provide 
sewerage services. States must always be free to delegate 
's~~ 
authority to their political subdivisions.j '\ASfS0'1::t::lng-a:s the 
( u~ , 
State authorize},f ~ C)\ty, as a matter of state policy, to 
a eot -i"fl.....j n .tl:te fie ld -of prov id~ sewage services and to 
~ 
laws under the state action exemption. 
l 
21. 
The Towns' argument amounts to 
pass the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must 
expressly state in a statute or its legislative history 
that it intends for the delegated action to have 
anticompetitive effects. This contention embodies an 
unrealistic view 
~~....,a , , ·t 11 c;;::: ~~ 
of how legislatures worJ;tA~· legislature 
can 
of 
be expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects 
0-.-~kh of ~ ~~:......-------------____, 
ever.:.JZ Jaw. MsrQ.Ove~ _ equiring such explicit 
authorization by the State would be unwise. Justice 
Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette was concerned that 
th~ur:;,i ty' s opinion ;... 71!----Gase would impose 








~equir~ such a close examination of State legislative 
+v~~ 
intent in order to decide if the federal anti trust laws 
-'\ 
apply ) potez: iaHy would embroil the federal courts in 
d~t~~~e'{/::c;-~~ental 
a~ Besides unnecessarily burdening the courts, it would 
thwart the fundamental policy of Parker and the state 
action doctrine of immunizing state action from federal 
antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, 
Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
The Towns Of>!>ett.eJ.C?.: [ a~~at the "clear 
1-(..l~t-
articulation" ~ of the state action test requires at 
""' 
least that the City show that the State "compelled" it to 
act. In so doing, they rely on language in Cantor v. 
Detroit Edison Co., 428 u.s. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. 
23. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975). We disagree with 
this contention for several reasons. E-irs&, Cantor and 
), 
Goldfarb concerned private parties--not municipalities--
~~~-~~ 
action exemption,~ J;zm =.t.he cases are /\ 
~~~ 
claiming the state 






u4~ ~/~L .~ 
See supra, at 
~ 
,; 
SQcond_,_ /(we have concluded in another 
case decided today, Southern Motor Carriers Rate 
Conference, Inc. v. United States, u.s. __ , that even 
?L-Ot~ 
a private party is ) Ft&t requirM 
?If" 
to show compulsion 
~~~ (/)1-~ 
sue~eeg in a def~nse 
~~ 
state action QX8mption. ---rr-
24. 
that the private party's anticompetitive 
undertaken pursuant to State policy. 
Even if we were to require a private party to show th~t 
the State compelled it to act, however, 
a requirement as unnecessary where the actor is 
----------·---------------
None of our cases involving the application 
of the state action exemption to a municipality has 
required that compulsion be shown. Rathe!=-,. .loth City of 
Lafayette and City of Boulder spoke in terms of the 
State's direction or authorization of the anticompetitive 
practice at issue. City of Boulder, supra, at 56-57; City 
of Lafayette, supra, at 416-417. This is so because where 
the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly 
articulated state policy, compulsion is simply 
25. 
unnecessary, as an evidentiary matter, to prove that the 
challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, 
~ 
~ rl6t.A.*f J .... £?<-~ ~~ 
although compulsio~may s~ ~9od evidence of State policy, 
~~'L 
it is by no means a prerequisite to a _.{ municipality ')_ 
6-<::.~~~--~ " 




As noted above , although City of Lafayette suggested 
show that its anticompetitive conduct was 
actively supervised by the State before it could obtain 
exemption under the state action doctrine, that suggestion 
was contained in a plurality opinion. The Court as a 
whole applied the supervision requirement to private 
parties in Midcal, supra, but expressly left the issue 
open as to municipalities in City of Boulder, supra. We 
26 • 
. ~t requ1remen ( 
rl.-./1! 4 .,.....,.,..C,..iJI•r- ~ I 





Like the compulsion requirement discussed above, the' 
requirement of active state supervision serves essentially) 
an evidentiary funct~t is one way of ensuring that 
the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant 
to State policy. In Midcal, we stated that the active 
state supervision requirement was necessary to prevent a 
State from circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions 
"by casting a . • • gauzy cloak of state involvement over 
what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 
445 u.s., at 106. Where the actor is not a private party, 
~trY-~ 
but a municipality, however, there is n9 danger that wfiat7~ 
1\ 
~is involvedj'i&~ ~ivate price-fixing arrangement. 
27. 
As a creation of the State, organized for the purpose 
of executing delegated State functions, municipalities 
stand in an inherently different relationship to the State 
than do private parties. As long as the municipality is 
acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to 
displace competition, as it is here, there is no need to 
require state supervision to be sure either that a state 
policy is at work or that the power delegated by the State 
is not being abused. Where a private party is engaging in 
the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that 
he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the 
governmental interests of the State. State supervision is 
therefore required to ensure that the delegated power is 
not being abused. Municipalities, on the other hand, 
share the State's interest in furthering public goals; the 
28. 
only real danger is that a municipality will seek to 
further purely parochial interests at the expense of more 
overriding State goals. This danger is minimal, however, 
because of the requirement that the municipality be acting 
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once it 
is established that the particular actions in question 
were authorized by such a state policy, there is no need 
to require the State to supervise actively the 
municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated 
function. 
In addition to being unnecessary, we believe that 
requiring states to supervise municipal conduct actively 
would be unwise. Wisconsin, like many other states, has a 
tradition of delegating broad authority to municipalities 
to regulate a wide range of matters of largely local 
29. 
concern. See Town of Hallie v. Ci tv of Chippewa Falls, 
105 Wis.2d 533, 539, 314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982). This is 
necessary to accomplish efficient and effective local 
government. To require active supervision by the State 
would erode local autonomy and hobble the State's ability 
to focus on more general matters of statewide concern. 
Yet, the absence of such close supervision will not 
broaden the scope of the state action exemption. By 
requiring that a municipality's action be authorized by a 
clearly articulated state policy, we may be certain that 
state action, and not purely local interests, are at work. 
This remains true to the fundamental principle of Parker 




We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire 
in this case were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated 
state policy to replace competition in the provision of 
sewerage services with regulation. Finding no need to 
require the State to supervise the City's execution of its 
delegated functions, we accordingly affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 




TOWN OF HALLIE, et al. v. CITY OF EAU CLAIRE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December __ , 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a 
municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by 
2. 
the state action exemption to the federal anti trust laws 
established by Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943), when 
the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the 
State, and the State does not actively supervise the 
anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners--Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")--are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the 
City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is 
located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit 
against the City in United States District Court for the 
1The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa 
Counties. 
3. 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief 
and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the 
provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and 
Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such 
services to the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation . 2 serv1ces. Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§1151, et seq., the City 
had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage 
treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, 
which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in 
the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
2The complaint also alleged violations of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§1151, et seq., 
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve. The 
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at 
issue in this Court. 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to 
and to use the City's sewage collection and transportation 
competitors 
City in the collection and transportation of sewage, the 
Towns contended in the District Court that the City used 
its monopoly over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful 
monopoly over the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. 
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an 
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal 
with the Towns. 
; 
5. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that 
Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of 
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace 
~ *-? 
competition with regulation.r;he court also found that the 
State adequately supervised the municipality's conduct 
~ 
through the State Department of Natural Resources, ~h 
was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning 
provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations 
of land. The court concluded that the City's allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct fell within the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as set forth in 
Community Communications Co. v.C ~~i~t~v~o~f~=B~o~u~l~d~e~r~, 455 u.s. 
40 (1982), and Parker v. Brown, supra. 
complaint. 
A c.ccJnli~tsl'j 1 
.l't dismissed the 
;1 
6. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed. 700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that 
the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide 
sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to 
unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that 
the State had contemplated that anticompeti tive effects 
might result. The City's conduct thus constituted state 
action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving 
"a local government performing a traditional municipal 
function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was 
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such 
supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be 
unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and 
7. 
home rule that were clearly expressed in the state's 
statutes. 
We granted certiorari, u.s. (1984), and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state 
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In 
Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act 
as applying to the anticompeti tive conduct of a State 
acting through its legislature. 317 u.s., at 350-351. 
Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to 
prohibit private restraints on trade, and it refused to 
infer an intent to "nullify a state's control over its 
8. 
officers and agents" in activities directed by the 
legislature. 
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on 
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust 
laws by virtue of their status because they are not 
themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 412 (1978). Rather, to 
obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate 
~~ )./" 
that their anticompetitive activities were d4rectQd by the 
1\. 
State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition 
with regulation or monopoly public service." Id., at 413 
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Thus, a showing by the 
municipality that its anticompetitive activities 
~~,~~~L...,~~~ 
oeRstit.y,.t.e. •t.at.Q... ae l:"i-ei1 entitles it to exemption from 
A 
Sherman Act liability. 
9. 
that a municipality's activities 
constitute state action is not a purely formalistic 
inquiry: the State may not validate a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be 
lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351. 
of Lafayette plurality concluded )~ 
~ 
Rather, the City 
-1 
the municipality 
must establish that it acted pursuant to a "clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
Ht..~f-
policy" wl:H:eh was "actively supervised" by the State, 435 
u.s., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative 
authorization" in order to assert a successful Parker 
* defense to an antitrust suit. Id., at 415./The plurality +./7 
viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] 
to the States their freedom to administer state regulatory 
10. 
policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust 
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial 
interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market goals." 
!d., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous 
Court applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a 
case in which the state action exemption was claimed by a 
private party. In that case, we found no antitrust 
immunity for California's wine pricing system. Even 
though there was a clear legislative policy to permit 
resale liquor price maintenance, there was no state 
supervision of the anticompeti ti ve activity. Thus, the 
private wine producers who set resale prices were not 
entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
11. 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, l1owa-: we 
~ declined to apply y the City of Lafayette test. We 
" held that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment to its 
Constitution, conferring on municipal governments general 
authority to govern local affairs, did not constitute a 
"clear articulation" of a state policy to authorize 
anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of 
cable television in the locale. Because the city could 
not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state 
supervision" component of the test. Id., at 51-52, n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a 
municipality will be entitled to the protection of the 
12. 
state action exemption to the anti trust laws, it must 
demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity 
pursuant to a clearly expressed /tate policy. We have 
~~ 
never fully a~dressee, however, how clearly a state policy 
1 
must be articulated for a municipality to be able to say 
that its anticompeti ti ve activity constitutes state 
action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the 
whether action by a municipality--like action 
by a private party--must satisfy the "active state 
supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-
52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
13. 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code -
to support its claim that its allegedly anticompeti ti ve 
activity constitutes state action. We therefore examine 
the statutory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to 
construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with 
reasonable particularity the district to be [served] 0 n /h,cl. 
This grant of authority is supplemented by §66.069(2) (c), 
providing that a city .operating a public utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service 
in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall 
delineate the area within which service will be 
provided and the municipal utility shall have no 
obligation to serve beyond the area so 
delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, §144.07(1) 
provides that the State'.s Department of Natural Resources 
14. 
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so 
that other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the 
system, and the Department may order that such connections 
be made. Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order 
by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection 
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void 
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city~ 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do 
not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the 
provision of sewage services because they make no express 
mention of anticompetitive conduct~ As discussed above, 
~ ~The Towns 1 also rely on §§66. 076 ( 1) and 66.30 of the 
Wisconsin cbde to argue that the State's policy on the ~ 7 
provision Of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve. 
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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15. 
the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in 
anticompeti ti ve conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable 
result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed 
areas. It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the 
jtate legislature to have stated explicitly that it 
expected the City to engage in conduct that would have 
anticompetitive effects. Applying the analysis of City of 
UA-~ ~ 
support the co tention. First, it is true that §66.076(1) ~ 
permits municipalities, including towns, to _ j 
operate sewage syste The rov' · is simply a general~~~ 
enabling statute, owever, not a mandatory prescription. 
In addition, subse of §66.076 incorporates into 
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66.069, 
including the power to limit the area of service. Thus, 
§66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state 
attitude. 
Nor does §66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general 
provision concerning all utilities--not just sewerage 
systems--that permits municipalities to enter into 
cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but 
merely permissive. Moreover, even assuming two 
municipalities agreed pursuant to this section to 
cooperate in providing sewage services, the result would 
not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two 
combined might well be more effective than either alone in 
keeping other municipalities out of the market. 
16. 
Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes 
authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to 
determine the areas to be served. We think it is clear 
that anticompeti ti ve effects logically would result from 
this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor Vehicle 
Board v. Orrin w. Fox Co., 439 u.s. 96, 109 (1978} (no 
express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"} • Accord) 1 P. Areeda & o. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982}. 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the 
statutes at issue here are neutral on /tate policy. 
Towns~attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home ~ 
t 
The I 
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing 
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave 
17. 
the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or 
free-market competition in the field of sewage services. 
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Color ado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it 
was neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" 
component of the state action test. The Amendment simply 
did not address the regulation of cable television. Under 
Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every 
aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as 
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local 
concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically 
authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sew~e services 
and has delegated to the cities the express authority to 
18. 
take action that foreseeably will result in 
anticompeti ti ve effects. No reasonable argument can be 
made that these statutes are neutral in the same way that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment was. ~~ 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to 
pass the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must 
expressly state in a statute or its legislative history 
that it intends for the delegated action to have 
anticompetitive effects. This contention embodies an 
unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how 
statutes are written. No legislature can be expected to 
catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
~14Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes 
leave to the City the discretion whether to provide ~ 
sew~ge services. States must always be free to delegate d( 
authority to their political subdivisions. 
19. 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by 
the State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in 
City of Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's 
opinion would impose this kind of requirement on 
legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern 
themselves. 435 u.s., at 434-435. This Cour~  
has never required the degree of specificity that the 
Towns insist is necessary. -~ 
\!:1 fi Requir i_ng 
5 
such a close examination of c:t. A tate 
legislat~' intent to determine whether the federal 
antitrust laws apply would be undesirable also because it 
would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary 
interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the 
courts, it would thwart the fundamental policy of Parker 
and the state action doctrine of immunizing state act1on 
from federal anti trust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
20. 
~) 
In ~t, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes 
evidence a "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" state policy to displace competition with 
regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage 
services. These statutory provisions plainly show that 
"the legislature contemplated the kind of action 
~ 
complained of." / City of Lafayette, supra, at 415. i)/This 
\JI'four view of the legislature's intent is supported by 
Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533, 
314 N.W.2d 321 (1982), in which the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie's challenge under 
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in 
a case quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town 
of Hallie argued that the City's refusal to provide it 
with sewage treatment services, the requirement of 
annexation, and the City's conditioning of the provision 
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage 
collection and other city services, violated the state 
antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, 
concluding that the legislature intended the City to 
undertake the challenged actions. Those actions would 
therefore be be exempt from the state's anti trust laws. 
Analysing §§66. 069 ( 2) (c) and 144.07 (1m) , the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by 
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a 
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before 
extending sewer services to the area." Id., at 540-541, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
21. 
is sufficient to satisfy the clear articulation 
requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" 
requirement of the state action test requires at least 
that the City show that the State "compelled" it to act. 
In so doing, they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 428 u.s. 579 (1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975). We disagree with this 
contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb 
concerned private parties--not municipalities--claiming 
314 N.W.2d, at 325. 
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does 
not, of course, decide the question presented here 1 ~he 
City's immunity under the federal anti trust laws, it is 
instructive on the question of the state legislature's t 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal 
provision of sewerage services. 
22. 
the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those 
cases because a municipality is an arm of the state. We 
may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the 
municipality acts ~ Jt~ public interest ... at ~ri:. A 
private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be 
crf-,h-
acting primarily on his own behalf. 
\. 
See infra, at 
Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today, 
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United 
States, u.s. __ , a private party is not invariably 
required to show compulsion where the state authorization 
or approval is clear. 
None of our cases involving the application of the 
state action exemption to a municipality has required that 
compulsion be shown. 
/~' u.t- 5"'/.. -S'" 
Both City of Lafayette and City of 
,~, ~t 1./tC ~ '/17 J 
Boulder spoke in terms of the State's direction or 
A, 
23. 
authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. 
a municipality, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated 
state policy, compulsion is simply 
evidentiary 
constitutes 
mat~ to prove that the 
state action. In short, 
as an unnecessar~ 
challenged practice 
although compulsion 
affirmatively expressed is g~siv~ evidence of state 
policy, it is by no means a prerequisite to a finding that 
a municipality acted pursuant to clearly articulated state 
policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active 
state supervision, the City may not depend on the state 
action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in 
24. 
City of Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have 
not been entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of 
Lafayette did say, without elaboration, that a city 
claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive 
conduct was actively supervised by the State. 435 u.s., 
at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association 
v. Midcal, 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that 
supervision is required where the anticompetitive conduct 
is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the 
most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue 
open as to municipalities. We now conclude that the 
active state supervision requirement should not be imposed 
in cases in which the actor is a municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at __ , the requirement of active state 
25. 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: 
it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in 
the challenged conduct pursuant to State policy. In 
Midcal, we stated that the active state supervision 
requirement was necessary to prevent a State from 
circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting 
a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 
U.S., at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he 
~ ISk+f 
is acting to further his ,1-own interests, rather than the 
governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
not a private party, but a municipality~howeve~ there is 
little or no danger that it is involved in a private 
price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it 
26. 
will seek to further purely parochial public interests at 
the expense of more overriding /tate goals. This danger 
is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the 
municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state 
policy. Once it is clear that state authorization exists, 
there is no need to require the State to supervise 
actively the municipality's execution of what is a 
properly delegated function.~ 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire 
~ 
~·In addition to being unnecessary, requiring states 
to supervise municipal conduct actively wou d be unwise. 
Wisconsin, like many other states, has a radition of 
delegating broad authority to municipalities t regulate a 
wide range of matters of largely local concer . See Town 
of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2 533, 539, 
314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982). To require active upervision 
by the State would erode local autonomy and -R-ebble the 




d.£;~~ UL "3~ dJ--.1 
in this case1 were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated 
state policy to replace competition in the provision of 
sewerage services w.i th regulation. Finding no need 
the State to supervise the City's execution 
~ accordingly affirm the -
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
/VJLr~~~~~ 
/]_,~ - Vz_ ~~- ~ 
~~ -1-.9 #i'G >0<~~ 
~~~~·'-~~ 
~ ~ aA-~ LA/ a--. 
/)U<t.' ~· ~ 
~A-~p~ 
-1 ~,?<-- . /.1 
~/)rt', ~~ ~ 
~~~~ 
1-J~ 
lfp/ss 12/18/84 Rider A, p. 26 (Hallie) 
HAL25 SALLY-POW 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no 
active state supervision, the City may not rely on the 
state action exemption. Reliance by the Towns is placed 
primarily on language in City of Lafayette. It is fair to 
say that our cases have not been entirely clear. The 
plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did say, without 
elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption must show 
that its anti-competitive conduct was actively supervised 
by the State. In Midcal, a unanimous Court held that 
supervision is required where the anti-competitive conduct 
is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the 
most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue 
open as to municipalities. We now conclude that the 
2. 
active state supervision requirement should not be imposed 
in cases in which the actor is a municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument 
discussed above, the requirement of active state 
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1\ 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no 
active state supervision, the City may not rely on the 
state action exemption. Reliance by the Towns is placed 
primarily on language in City of Lafayette. It is fair to 
say that our cases have not been entirely clear. The 
plurality opinion in City of Lafayette did say, without 
elaboration, that a city claiming the exemption must show 
that its anti-competitive conduct was actively supervised 
by the State. In Midcal, a unanimous Court held that 
supervision is required where the anti-competitive conduct 
is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the 
most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue 
open as to municipalities. We now conclude that the 
2. 
active state supervision requirement should not be imposed 
in cases in which the actor is a municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument 
discussed above, the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: 
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No. 82-1832 
TOWN OF HALLIE, et al. v. CITY OF EAU CLAIRE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December __ , 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a 
municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by 
2. 
the state action exemption to the federal anti trust laws 
established by Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943), when 
the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the 
State, and the State does not actively supervise the 
anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners--Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of Washington (the "Towns")--are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the 
City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is 
located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit 
against the City in United States District Court for the 
1The City is located in both Eau Claire and Chippewa 
Counties. 
3. 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief 
and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the 
provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and 
Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such 
services to the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water 
/;}.S/ 
Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§~, et seq., the City 
had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage 
treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, 
which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in 
the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
~ 2
The complaint also alleged violations of:Jt-he Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ffi.h et seq., 
and of a common law duty of a utility to serve. The 
district court dismissed these claims, and they are not at 
issue in this Court. 
4. 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of 
the Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area 
vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by 
the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§66.024(4}, 144.07(1}, and 
to use the City's sewage collection and transportation 
services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the 
City in the collection and transportation of sewage, the 
Towns contended in the District Court that the City used 
its monopoly over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful 
monopoly over the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. 
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an 
5. 
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal 
with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that 
Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of 
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace 
competition with regulation. The court also found that 
the State adequately supervised the municipality's 




authorized to review municipal decisions concerning 
provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations 
of land. The court concluded that the City's allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct fell within the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as set forth in 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 
6. 
40 (1982), and Parker v. Brown, supra. Accordingly, it 
dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed. 700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that 
the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide 
sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to 
unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that 
the State had contemplated that anticompeti tive effects 
might result. The City's conduct thus constituted state 
action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving 
"a local government performing a traditional municipal 
function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was 
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such 
supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be 
7. 
unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and 
home rule that were clearly expressed in the state's 
statutes. 
We granted certiorari, u.s. (1984) , and now 
affirm. 
II 
The starting point in any analysis involving the state 
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In 
Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act 
as applying to the anticompeti tive conduct of a State 
acting through its legislature. 317 u.s., at 350-351. 
Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to 
prohibit private restraints on trade, and it refused to 
8. 
infer an intent to "nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents" in activities directed by the 
legislature. ~ L /. 1 J- 3SI. 
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on 
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust 
laws by virtue of their status because they are not 
themselves sovereign. ;:::C..::::i-::t~v-~o~f=---....:L:=;a=f.!::ac...~..v...::e:...!t::....:t~e=- v. Louisiana "\ 
( op ,-.,..,Ov'l () 1- ~"'"'~"} :J. J 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978y. Rather, to 
obtain exemption, political subdivisions must demonstrate 
that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by 
the State "pursuant to state policy to displace 
competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 
7 
Id., at 413 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Thus, a showing by 
the municipality that its anticompetitive activities were 
9. 
duly authorized by the State entitles it to exemption from 
Sherman Act liability. 
The determination that a municipality's activities 
constitute state action is not a purely formalistic 
inquiry; the State may not validate a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be 
lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351. Rather, as the 
City of Lafayette plurality concluded, the municipality 
must establish that it acted pursuant to a "clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State, 435 
u.s., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative 
authorization" in order to assert a successful Parker 
defense to an antitrust suit. Id., at 415. The plurality 
10. 
viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] 
to the States their state regulatory 
policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust 
laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial 
interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market goals." 
Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous 
Court applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a 
case in which the state action exemption was claimed by a 
private party. In that case, we found no antitrust 
immunity for California's wine pricing system. Even 
though there was a clear legislative policy to permit 
resale liquor price maintenance, there was no state 
supervision of the anticompeti ti ve activity. Thus, the 
11. 
private wine producers who set resale prices were not 
entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
~
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to 
apply literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that 
Colorado's Home Rule Amendment to its Constitution, 
conferring on municipal governments general authority to · 
govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear 
articulation" of a state policy to authorize 
anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of 
cable television in the locale. Because the City could 
not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state 
LJc;::> l). 5., 
~at 51-52, n. 14. supervision" component of the test. I 
12. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a 
municipality will be entitled to the protection of the 
state action exemption to the anti trust laws, it must 
demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity 
pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have 
never fully considered, however, how clearly a state 
policy must be articulated for a municipality to be able 
to say that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state 
action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the 
question whether action by a municipality--like action by 
a private party--must satisfy the "active state 
supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-
52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
13. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code 
to support its claim that its allegedly anticompeti tive 
activity constitutes state action. We therefore examine 
the statutory structure in some detail. 
A 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to 
construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with 
reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." 
Ibid. This grant of authority is supplemented by 
§66.069(2) (c), providing that a city operating a public 
utility 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service 
in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall 
delineate the area within which service will be 
provided and the municipal utility shall have no 
obligation to serve beyond the area so 
delineated." 
14. 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, §144.07(1) 
provides that the State's Department of ·Natural Resources 
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so 
that other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the 
system, and the Department may order that such connections 
be made. Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order 
by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection 
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void 
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city.
3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do 
3There is no such order of the Department of Natural 
Resources at issue in this case. 
15. 
not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the 
provision of sewage services because they make no express 
mention of anticompetitive conduct. 4 As discussed above, 
the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in 
anticompeti ti ve conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable 
4The Towns also rely on §§66.076(1) and 66.30 of the 
Wisconsin code to argue that the State's policy on the 
provision of sewage services is actually procompeti ti ve. 
This claim must fail because, aside from the fact that it 
was not raised below, the provisions relied upon do not 
support the contention. First, it is true that §66.076(1) 
permits certain municipalities, including towns, to 
operate sewage systems. The provision is simply a general 
enabling statute, however, not a mandatory prescription. 
In addition, subsection ( 8) of §66. 076 incorporates into 
the enabling statute all of the limitations of §66. 069, 
including the power to limit the area of service. Thus, 
§66.076(1) does not express a procompetitive state 
attitude. 
Nor does §66.30 aid the Towns. It is a general 
provision concerning all utilities--not just sewerage 
systems--that permits municipalities to enter into 
cooperative agreements. The statute is not mandatory, but 
merely permissive. Moreover, even assumin9 two 
municipalities agreed pursuant to this sect1on to 
cooperate in providing sewage services, the . result would 
not necessarily be greater competition. Rather, the two 
combined might well be more effective than either alone in 
keeping other municipalities out of the market. 
16. 
result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed 
areas. It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the 
state legislature to have stated explicitly that it 
expected the City to engage in conduct that would have 
anticompetitive effects. Applying the analysis of City of 
Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes 
authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to 
determine the areas to be served. We think it is clear 
that anticompetitive effects logically would result from 
this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor Vehicle 
Board v. Orrin w. Fox Co., 439 u.s. 96, 109 (1978) (no 
express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
17. 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the 
statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The 
Towns attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home 
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing 
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave 
the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or 
free-market competition in the field of sewage services. 
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it 
was neutral and did not satisfy the "clear articulation" 
component of the state action test. The Amendment simply 
did not address the regulation of cable television. Under 
Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every 
18. 
aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as 
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local 
concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically 
authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and 
has delegated to the cities the express authority to take 
action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive 
effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these 
statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home 
5 Rule Amendment was. 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to 
pass the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must 
expressly state in a statute or its legislative history 
5Nor does it help the Towns' claim that the statutes 
leave to the City the discretion whether to provide sewage 
services. States must always be free to delegate such 
authority to their political subdivisions. 
19. 
that it intends for the delegated action to have 
anticompetitive effects. This contention embodies an 
unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how 
statutes are written. No legislature can be expected to 
catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by 
the State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in 
City of Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's 
opinion would impose this kind of requirement on 
legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern 
themselves. 435 u.s., at 434-435. This Court has never 
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist 
is necessary. 6 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
20. 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes 
evidence a "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" state policy to displace competition with 
regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage 
services. These statutory provisions plainly show that 
' "the .A legislature contemplated the kind of action 
complained of!\' City of Lafayette, supra, at 415.1 7 This 
'' / .Jtc,·~;~ 
~~" ~~ur~.;; ",ft:;;/J..)1 
6 )Z. ,.-.o-Q , ) 
6Requiring such a close examination of a state 
legislature's intent to determine whether the federal 
antitrust laws apply would be undesirable also because it 
would embroil the federal courts in the unnecessary 
interpretation of state statutes. Besides burdening the 
courts, it would thwart the fundamental policy of Parker 
and the state action doctrine of immunizing state action 
from federal antitrust scrutiny. See 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law, supra, §212.3(b) (Supp. 1982). 
7our view of the legislature 1 s intent is supported by 
Town of Hallie v. Cit{ of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533, 
314 N.W.2d 321 (198 ) , in which the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin rejected the Town of Hallie 1 s challenge under 
state antitrust laws against the City of Chippewa Falls in 
a case quite similar to the one at bar. There, the Town 
of Hallie argued that the City 1 s refusal to provide it 
with sewage treatment services, the requirement of 
annexation, and the City 1 s conditioning of the provision 
of treatment services on the acceptance also of sewage 
Footnote continued on next page. 
21. 
is sufficient to satisfy the clear articulation 
requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the "clear articulation" 
requirement of the state action test requires at least 
that the City show that the State "compelled" it to act. 
In so doing, they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 428 u.s. 579 (1976}, and Goldfarb v. Virginia 
collection and other city services, violated the state 
antitrust laws. The state supreme court disagreed, 
concluding that the legislature intended the City to 
undertake the challenged actions. Those actions would 
therefore be be exempt from the state's anti trust laws. 
Analysing §§66.069(2} (c) and 144.07(lm}, the court 
concluded that the legislature had "viewed annexation by 
the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a 
reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before 
extending sewer services to the area." Id., at 540-541, 
314 N.W.2d, at 325. --
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion does 
not, of course, decide the question presented here of the 
City's immunity under the federal antitrust laws, it is 
instructive on the question of the state legislature's 
intent in enacting the statutes relating to the municipal 
provision of sewerage services. 
22. 
State Bar , 4 21 U • S . 7 7 3 ( 19 7 5 ) . We disagree with this 
contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb 
concerned private parties--not municipalities--claiming 
the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those 
cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We 
may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the 
municipality acts in the public interest. A private 
party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting 
primarily on his or its own behalf. infra, at 
Also, as we have concluded in another case decided today, 
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United 
States, u.s. __ , a private party is not invariably 
required to show compulsion where the state authorization 
or approval is clear. 
23. 
None of our cases involving the application of the 
state action exemption to a municipality has required that 
compulsion be shown. 
toul ti.£v- L/Ss US:.> 
Both ~CJ,ij;~~y~oQ!f__:!L:!!a~f~a~·.~·e!tt~t~e, ~at 
J..« f,yd{e 45~ u.s. 
56-57 , and ~CJ,ij;tj!Y~OQ.fL~B~e!!t:t~·l~d~e?.:f'~,, ~at 416-417 , spoke in 
terms of the State's direction or authorization of the 
anticompetitive practice at issue. This is so because 
where the actor is a municipality, acting pursuant to a 
clearly articulated state policy, compulsion is simply 
unnecessary as an evidentiary matter to prove that the 
challenged practice constitutes state action. In short, 
although compulsion affirmatively expressed is good 
evidence of state policy, it is by no means a prerequisite 
to a finding that a municipality acted pursuant to clearly 
articulated state policy. 
IV 
24. 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active 
state supervision, the City may not depend on the state 
action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in 
City of Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have 
not been entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of 
Lafayette did say, without elaboration, that a city 
claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive 
conduct was actively supervised by the State. 435 u.s., 
at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assooiatirn 
A-1 Ur"'i~ Ut"l I ,.., (. • 
s 
v. Midcalt 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court held that 
I 
supervision is required where the anticompetitive conduct 
is by private parties. In City of Boulder, however, the 
most recent relevant case, we expressly left this issue 
open as to municipalities. We now conclude that the 
25. 
active state supervision requirement should not be imposed 
in cases in which the actor is a municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at __ , the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: 
it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in 
the challenged conduct pursuant to State policy. In 
Midcal, we stated that the active state supervision 
requirement was necessary to prevent a State from 
circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting 
a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 
u.s., at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he 
is acting to further his own interests, rather than the 
26. 
governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
not a private party, but a municipality, there is little 
or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing 
arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to 
further purely parochial public interests at the expense 
of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, 
however, because of the requirement that the municipality 
act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once 
it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no 
need to require the State to supervise actively the 
municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated 
function. 8 
8
rn addition to being unnecessar equiringb ;,.~atr;s ~ 
to supervise munici conduct actively would e unw1se. v 
1scons1n, 1 e many other state , as a tradition of 
delegating broad authority to municipalities to regulate a 
wide range of matters of largely local concern. See Town 
Footnote continued on next page. ----
27. 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire 
in this case do not violate the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to 
replace competition in the provision of sewerage services 
with regulation. We further hold that active state 
supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the 
anti trust laws where the actor is a municipality rather 
than a private party. We accordingly affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis.2d 533, 539, 
314 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1982). To require active supervision 
by the State would erode local autonomy and limit the 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a 
municipality's anticompetitive activities are protected by 
2. 
the state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws 
established by Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943), when 
the activities are authorized, but not compelled, by the 
State, and the State does not actively supervise the 
anticompetitive conduct. 
I 
Petitioners--Town of Hallie, Town of Seymour, Town of 
Union, and Town of washington (the "Towns")--are four 
Wisconsin townships located adjacent to respondent, the 
City of Eau Claire (the "City"). Town of Hallie is 
located in Chippewa County, and the other three towns are 
located in Eau Claire County. 1 The Towns filed suit 
against the City in United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief 
and alleging that the City violated the Sherman Act, 15 
3. 
u.s.c. §1 et seq., by acquiring a monopoly over the 
provision of sewage treatment services in Eau Claire and 
Chippewa Counties, and by tying the provision of such 
services to the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services. 2 Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 u.s.c. §§1251, et seq., the City 
had obtained federal funds to help build a sewage 
treatment facility within the Eau Claire Service Area, 
which included the Towns; the facility is the only one in 
the market available to the Towns. The City has refused 
to supply sewage treatment services to the Towns. It does 
supply the services to individual landowners in areas of 
the Towns if a majority of the individuals in the area 
vote by referendum election to have their homes annexed by 
the City, see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§66.024(4}, 144.07(1}, and 
4. 
to use the City's sewage collection and transportation 
services. 
Alleging that they are potential competitors of the 
City in the collection and transportation of sewage, the 
Towns contended in the District Court that the City used 
its monopoly over sewage treatment to gain an unlawful 
monopoly over the provision of sewage collection and 
transportation services, in violation of the Sherman Act. 
They also contended that the City's actions constituted an 
illegal tying arrangement and an unlawful refusal to deal 
with the Towns. 
The District Court ruled for the City. It found that 
Wisconsin's statutes regulating the municipal provision of 
sewage service expressed a clear state policy to replace 
competition with regulation. The court also found that 
5. 
the State adequately supervised the municipality's conduct 
through the state's Department of Natural Resources, that 
was authorized to review municipal decisions concerning 
provision of sewage services and corresponding annexations 
of land. The court concluded that the City's allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct fell within the state action 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws, as set forth in 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 u.s. 
40 (1982), and Parker v. Brown, supra. Accordingly, it 
dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed. 700 F.2d 376 (CA7 1983). It ruled that 
the Wisconsin statutes authorized the City to provide 
sewage services and to refuse to provide such services to 
unincorporated areas. The court therefore assumed that 
6. 
the State had contemplated that anticompeti tive effects 
might result. The City's conduct thus constituted state 
action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, supra. The 
court also concluded that in a case such as this involving 
"a local government performing a traditional municipal 
function," 700 F.2d, at 384, active state supervision was 
unnecessary for Parker immunity to apply. Requiring such 
supervision as a prerequisite to immunity would also be 
unwise in this situation, the court believed, because it 
would erode traditional concepts of local autonomy and 
home rule that were clearly expressed in the state's 
statutes. 




The starting point in any analysis involving the state 
action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In 
Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act 
as applying to the anticompetitive conduct of a State 
acting through its legislature. 317 u.s., at 350-351. 
Rather, it ruled that the Sherman Act was intended to 
prohibit private restraints on trade, and it refused to 
infer an intent to "nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents" in activities directed by the 
legislature. !d., at 351. 
Municipalities and other subdivisions of the State, on 
the other hand, are not beyond the reach of the antitrust 
laws by virtue of their status because they are not 
themselves sovereign. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
8. 
Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 412 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). Rather, to obtain exemption, political 
subdivisions must demonstrate that their anticompetitive 
activities were authorized by the State "pursuant to state 
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly 
public service." Id., at 413. Thus, a showing by the 
municipality that its anticompetitive activities were duly 
authorized by the State entitles it to exemption from 
Sherman Act liability. 
The determination that a municipality's activities 
constitute state action is not a purely formalistic 
inquiry: the State may not validate a municipality's 
anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be 
lawful. Parker v. Brown, supra, at 351. Rather, as the 
City of Lafayette plurality concluded, the municipality 
9. 
must establish that it acted pursuant to a "clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy" that was "actively supervised" by the State, 435 
u.s., at 410. The municipality need not, however, "be 
able to point to a specific, detailed legislative 
authorization" in order to assert a successful Parker 
defense to an antitrust suit. Id., at 415. The plurality 
viewed this approach as desirable because it "preserv[ed] 
to the States their freedom to administer state 
regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal 
antitrust laws without at the same time permitting purely 
parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market 
goals." Id., at 415-416. 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous Court 
10. 
applied the City of Lafayette two-pronged test to a case 
in which the state action exemption was claimed by a 
private party. In that case, we found no antitrust 
immunity for California's wine pricing system. Even 
though there was a clear legislative policy to permit 
resale liquor price maintenance, there was no state 
supervision of the anticornpetitive activity. Thus, the 
private wine producers who set resale prices were not 
entitled to the state action exemption. When we again 
addressed the issue of a municipality's exemption from the 
antitrust laws in City of Boulder, supra, we declined to 
apply literally the City of Lafayette test. We held that 
Colorado's Horne Rule Amendment to its Constitution, 
conferring on municipal governments general authority to 
govern local affairs, did not constitute a "clear 
11. 
articulation" of a state policy to authorize 
anticompetitive conduct with respect to the regulation of 
cable television in the locale. Because the City could 
not meet this requirement of the state action test, we 
declined to decide whether governmental action by a 
municipality must also satisfy the "active state 
supervision" component of the test. 455 u.s., at 51-52, 
n. 14. 
It is therefore clear from our cases that before a 
municipality will be entitled to the protection of the 
state action exemption to the anti trust laws, it must 
demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity 
pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. We have 
never fully considered, however, how clearly a state 
policy must be articulated for a municipality to be able 
12. 
to say that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state 
action. Moreover, we have expressly left open the 
question whether action by a municipality--like action by 
a private party--must satisfy the "active state 
supervision" requirement. City of Boulder, supra, at 51-
52, n. 14. We consider both of those issues below. 
III 
The City cites several provisions of the Wisconsin code 
to support its claim that its allegedly anticompetitive 
activity constitutes state action. We therefore examine 
the statutory structure in some detail. 
A 
13. 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.18(1) grants authority to cities to 
construct, add to, alter, and repair sewerage systems. 
The authority includes the power to "describe with 
reasonable particularity the district to be [served]." 
Ibid. This grant of authority is supplemented by 
§66.069(2)(c), providing that a city operating a public 
utili~y 
"may by ordinance fix the limits of such service 
in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall 
delineate the area within which service will be 
provided and the municipal utility shall have no 
obligation to serve beyond the area so 
delineated." 
With respect to joint sewerage systems, §144.07(1) 
provides that the State's Department of Natural Resources 
may require a city's sewerage system to be constructed so 
that other cities, towns, or areas may connect to the 
system, and the Department may order that such connections 
be made. Subsection (lm) provides, however, that an order 
14. 
by the Department of Natural Resources for the connection 
of unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void 
if that territory refuses to become annexed to the city. 
3 
B 
The Towns contend that these statutory provisions do 
not evidence a state policy to displace competition in the 
provision of sewage services because they make no express 
t . f t' t' . d 4 men 1on o an 1compe 1t1ve con uct. As discussed above, 
the statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in 
anticompeti ti ve conduct. Such conduct is a foreseeable 
result of empowering the City to refuse to serve unannexed 
areas. It is not necessary, as the Towns contend, for the 
state legislature to have stated explicitly that it 
expected the City to engage in conduct that would have 
anticompetitive effects. Applying the analysis of City of 
15. 
Lafayette, supra, it is sufficient that the statutes 
authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to 
determine the areas to be served. We think it is clear 
that anticompeti ti ve effects logically would result from 
this broad authority to regulate. See New Motor Vehicle 
Board v. Orrin w. Fox Co., 439 u.s. 96, 109 (1978) (no 
express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but statute 
provided regulatory structure that inherently "displace[d] 
unfettered business freedom"). Accord, 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~212.3, at 54 (Supp. 1982). 
Nor do we agree with the Towns' contention that the 
statutes at issue here are neutral on state policy. The 
Towns attempt to liken the Wisconsin statutes to the Home 
Rule Amendment involved in City of Boulder, supra, arguing 
that the Wisconsin statutes are neutral because they leave 
16. 
the City free to pursue either anticompetitive conduct or 
free-market competition in the field of sewage services. 
The analogy to the Home Rule Amendment involved in City of 
Boulder is inapposite. That Amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution allocated only the most general authority to 
municipalities to govern local affairs. We held that it 
was neutral and did not satisfy the .. clear articulation .. 
component of the state action test. The Amendment simply 
did not address the regulation of cable television. Under 
Home Rule the municipality was to be free to decide every 
aspect of policy relating to cable television, as well as 
policy relating to any other field of regulation of local 
concern. Here, in contrast, the State has specifically 
authorized Wisconsin cities to provide sewage services and 
has delegated to the cities the express authority to take 
17. 
action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive 
effects. No reasonable argument can be made that these 
statutes are neutral in the same way that Colorado's Home 
Rule Amendment was. 5 
The Towns' argument amounts to a contention that to 
pass the "clear articulation" test, a legislature must 
expressly state in a statute or its legislative history 
that it intends for the delegated action to have 
anticompetitive effects. This contention embodies an 
unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how 
statutes are written. No legislature can be expected to 
catalog all of the anticipated effects of a statute of 
this kind. 
Furthermore, requiring such explicit authorization by 
the State would be unwise. Justice Stewart's dissent in 
18. 
City of Lafayette was concerned that the plurality's 
opinion would impose this kind of requirement on 
legislatures, with detrimental side effects upon 
municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern 
themselves. 435 u.s., at 434-435. This Court has never 
required the degree of specificity that the Towns insist 
is necessary. 6 
In sum, we conclude that the Wisconsin statutes 
evidence a .. clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed.. state policy to displace competition with 
regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewerage 
services. These statutory provisions plainly show that 
.. 'the legislature contemplated the kind of action 
complained of. ' .. City of Lafayette, supra, at 415 
(quoting the deicison of the court of appeals, 532 F.2d 
19. 
431, 434 (CAS 1976)). 7 This is sufficient to satisfy the 
clear articulation requirement of the state action test. 
c 
The Towns further argue that the 11 Clear articulation .. 
requirement of the state action test requires at least 
that the City show that the State 11 compelled 11 it to act. 
In so doing, they rely on language in Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 428 u.s. 579 {1976), and Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975). We disagree with this 
contention for several reasons. Cantor and Goldfarb 
concerned private parties--not municipalities--claiming 
the state action exemption. This fact distinguishes those 
cases because a municipality is an arm of the State. We 
may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the 
municipality acts in the public interest. A private 
20. 
party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting 
primarily on his or its own behalf. Also, as we have 
concluded in another case decided today, Southern Motor 
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, u.s. 
__ , a private party is not invariably required to show 
compulsion where the state authorization or approval is 
clear. 
None of our cases involving the application of the 
state action exemption to a municipality has required that 
compulsion be shown. Both City of Boulder, supra, 455 
u.s., at 56-57, and City of Lafayette, supra, 435 u.s., at 
416-417, spoke in terms of the State's direction or 
authorization of the anticompetitive practice at issue. 
This is so because where the actor is a municipality, 
acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, 
21. 
compulsion is simply unnecessary as an evidentiary matter 
to prove that the challenged practice constitutes state 
action. In short, although compulsion affirmatively 
expressed is good evidence of state policy, it is by no 
means a prerequisite to a finding that a municipality 
acted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy. 
IV 
Finally, the Towns argue that as there was no active 
state supervision, the City may not depend on the state 
action exemption. The Towns rely primarily on language in 
City of Lafayette. It is fair to say that our cases have 
not been entirely clear. The plurality opinion in City of 
Lafayette did say, without elaboration, that a city 
claiming the exemption must show that its anticompetitive 
conduct was actively supervised by the State. 435 u.s., 
22. 
at 410. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 u.s. 97 (1980), a unanimous 
Court held that supervision is required where the 
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. In City of 
Boulder, however, the most recent relevant case, we 
expressly left this issue open as to municipalities. We 
now conclude that the active state supervision requirement 
should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a 
municipality. 
As with respect to the compulsion argument discussed 
above, see supra, at ___ , the requirement of active state 
supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: 
it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in 
the challenged conduct pursuant to State policy. In 
Midcal, we stated that the active state supervision 
23. 
requirement was necessary to prevent a State from 
circumventing the Sherman Act's proscriptions "by casting 
a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 445 
u.s., at 106. Where a private party is engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he 
is acting to further his own interests, rather than the 
governmental interests of the State. Where the actor is 
not a private party, but a municipality, there is little 
or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing 
arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to 
further purely parochial public interests at the expense 
of more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, 
however, because of the requirement that the municipality 
act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Once 
24. 
it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no 
need to require the State to supervise actively the 
municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated 
function. 8 
v 
We conclude that the actions of the City of Eau Claire 
in this case do not violate the Sherman Act. They were 
taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to 
replace competition in the provision of sewerage services 
with regulation. We further hold that active state 
supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the 
anti trust laws where the actor is a municipality rather 
than a private party. We accordingly affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
